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Chapter 1
Introduction

3Well, just like the rest of us, you have to make choices with your money. Do you
want a bike, or do you want to not be depressed?
— Randy Marsh
When being offered a (supposed) remedy to his (alleged) depression, the little boy
addressed in this quote is confronted with a fact of life. His father points out that he
must come to a decision on how to allocate a scarce resource – his personal savings. This
constitutes a common description of what lies at the core of the questions investigated
by economists: how do people and organizations behave when they want it all, but their
means are limited? Very often, economic actors can get better off when they interact
with each other in voluntary exchange. Even when their interests are in conflict, a
mutually beneficial agreement may be found. Nonetheless, the pursuit of self-interest
by one side may harm the other as soon as there is a discrepancy in the information
available to both parties. In this book, we study the incentives that organizations set
for individual actors, such as employees or taxpayers, to overcome these problems.
The second chapter is joint work with Robert Dur and is inspired by a firm that does
something unusual: instead of offering their employees money to do a good job, they
offer them money to quit. This practice has caught the attention of several business
writers and we have picked up their key arguments and incorporated them into a model
that explains if and under what conditions such a pay-to-quit program is a good idea. In
an ever more complex work environment, the carrots and sticks prescribed by classical
economics can sometimes not be used. This is when finding workers who are intrinsically
motivated can help a firm to make sure that the worker’s interests are aligned with the
company’s: when people like what they do, they typically do it well. This notion is a
well established fact for various jobs, but naturally applies to situations far beyond the
workplace.
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The firm’s task may then switch from providing the right incentives to its workers
to making sure to select the right workers in the first place, namely the motivated
ones. This endeavor can prove to be non-trivial when unmotivated workers feel induced
to mimic their motivated colleagues. In our model, the firm must offer a steep wage
profile so that only workers with a long-term interest in a job consider applying. As
a consequence, some unmotivated workers are reluctant to quit after finding out they
do not like the job. In that situation, offering the right amount of money to people
that decide to leave can ensure that unmotivated workers quit. At the same time, the
motivated ones prefer to remain at the firm because of the motivational rents they enjoy.
Our model shows that this exit bonus only increases the firm’s profits when workers
do not anticipate it. Furthermore, we show that a firm only finds an exit bonus useful
when motivation plays not too big of a role.
As important as intrinsic motivation is for some occupations, almost all publicly
traded firms provide extrinsic motivation to their executives in the form of equity and
bonuses. While the provision of stock and stock options generally aligns the executive’s
income with the value of the firm, cash bonuses can be used to reward differently spec-
ified goals. This can be a useful tool when equity does not provide sufficient incentives
for an executive to engage in certain activities. Reducing the firm’s tax burden, for
example, can amount to a substantial increase in net profits, but doing so can be a
risky undertaking for a manager. If some of the firm’s tax sheltering activities are ille-
gal, an executive can even be held personally liable when such fraud is detected. As a
consequence, a profit-maximizing firm may find it in its best interest to provide explicit
incentives for tax sheltering.
While firms do have to report the level of bonuses paid out to their executives, the
exact contract structure usually remains a secret. We thus do not know exactly what
behavior is rewarded with a cash bonus. In the third chapter, I use data from the
51,500 most important firms that are publicly traded in the United States to investigate
if there is a relationship between corporate taxes and chief executive officer (CEO)
bonus payments. I find evidence that the average bonus contract rewards tax savings
excessively when compared to other measures that increase corporate net profits, which
confirms the hypothesis that managers require compensation for the additional risk
inherent in running an aggressive tax strategy. In accordance with previous literature,
I document a substantial heterogeneity in compensation practices across industries. It
appears that the main result is driven by firms in the Industrial and Retail sectors. I
further find that companies with greater tax planning opportunities are more likely to
condition the CEO’s bonus on corporate income taxes.
Just like a CEO who engages in tax sheltering for his firm, citizens who cheat on their
personal tax reports face the risk of getting caught. Compared to the potential benefits
of evading taxes, this risk is rather low, so that a neoclassical analysis of the monetary
costs and benefits of tax evasion fails to explain why most people pay their taxes.
Considering social preferences, such as the rise of a feeling of guilt when evading taxes,
can be a solution to this puzzle. Nonetheless, the aggregate amount of taxes withheld
is rarely negligible. In an attempt to increase tax revenue, many governments allow tax
offenders the possibility to dodge punishment when they turn themselves in, some even
permanently do so. It is clear that this practice yields additional government receipts
when it comes as a one-time offer, but can a standing voluntary disclosure program also
be profitable?
If people had the same information at the time when they decide to withhold taxes
as when they are offered to come clean about it, nobody would make use of such a
program. In the fourth Chapter, I analyze the implications of a possible change in
people’s feeling of guilt after handing in their tax report. My analysis provides insights
into the costs and benefits for the government of offering their citizens the possibility
6 Introduction
to make a voluntary disclosure. I show that governmental leniency not only increases
tax revenue when it comes as a surprise, but even when taxpayers anticipate it.
Chapter 2
Paid to Quit
Joint work with Robert Dur
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2.1 Introduction
Recently, an online vendor in the United States has caught attention with an unusual
hiring practice; Zappos of Henderson, Nevada has been running a scheme offering all
newly hired employees after their first four weeks a one-off payment of $4,000 if they
decide to quit. According to the CEO of Zappos, the idea behind this policy is to
provide newcomers with an additional incentive to leave the company if they find out
that they do not completely fit in with the corporate culture (cf. Hsieh 2010). A few
other tech companies have copied the practice in the meanwhile, including Amazon,
Lot18, and Riot Games (see Taylor 2014, Jeffries 2012, and Edwards 2014).
Reactions to this uncommon policy have been mixed. In a Harvard Business Review
Blog entry titled “Why Zappos Pays New Employees to Quit – And You Should Too”,
Taylor (2008) attributes the online shoe store’s fast growth to the quality of their
customer service. He suggests that the exit bonus has been essential in selecting the
right employees for this task and recommends other companies to copy Zappos’ practice:
“[Offering the exit bonus is] a small practice with big implications: Companies don’t
engage emotionally with their customers – people do. If you want to create a memorable
company, you have to fill your company with memorable people” (Taylor 2008). A
Bloomberg Businessweek article is, however, more critical about Zappos’ hiring practice,
wondering: “[What] if hordes of people are going to start queueing up outside Zappos
[...], what’s to keep every young hopeful with gas money to roll in, attend part of the
training, and head down the highway to the casinos with $2,000 in his pocket? It will be
interesting to see what the impact of word-of-mouth will have on this odd HR process”
(McFarland 2008).1
This chapter explores under what conditions an exit bonus could be part of a profit-
maximizing personnel policy. Our theory picks up key aspects of the two articles quoted
1Note that the exit bonus has increased to $4,000 in the meanwhile.
10 Paid to Quit
above. We show that it can be optimal for a firm to offer an exit bonus, because
it promotes self-selection of unmotivated workers out of employment, as suggested by
Taylor (2008). On the other hand, this practice can be dangerous because it may attract
workers without intentions to remain with the firm, as pointed out by McFarland (2008).
In line with this, and consistent with Zappos’ conduct, we show that the exit bonus
needs to come as a surprise for workers in order to function well.
In our principal-agent model, agents differ in three respects: their commitment to the
job, their outside opportunities, and their intrinsic motivation to work for the principal.
All of these aspects are private information of the agents, which gives rise to two adverse
selection problems. First, the principal would like to avoid hiring uncommitted agents
who know beforehand that they only want to work for her for a short while. She can
resolve this first problem by setting a low wage for an initial period. This, however,
necessitates offering a high wage for the remaining time in order to satisfy the committed
agents’ participation constraint, similar to the classic model in Lazear (1979). The
heterogeneity in outside options affects the severity of the first adverse selection problem
and thereby influences the wage differential between periods.
At the time of application to the job, agents are already aware of the realizations of
the first two dimensions of heterogeneity, namely their level of commitment and their
outside opportunities. However, they only learn about their intrinsic motivation to work
for the principal during the initial period. We thus follow Jovanovic (1979) in treating a
job as an experience good – the only way of finding out whether the job is a good match,
or in our case whether an agent is intrinsically motivated to work in this particular job,
is experiencing it. The agent’s motivation cannot be readily observed by the principal.
This precipitates the second adverse selection problem, because the principal prefers to
retain only motivated agents. Handy and Katz (1998) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007)
show that such an adverse selection problem could be mitigated from the outset by
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offering a low wage so that only motivated agents find it worthwhile to apply for the
job. This is, however, not possible in our setting, because the job is an experience
good. Thus the overall wage profile needs to be attractive enough to convince agents to
apply before it is clear to them whether they will enjoy the job. Consequently, the firm
inevitably hires some agents who discover that they are unmotivated and do not enjoy
the job. The principal could prompt these agents to quit by offering a lower wage once
agents have discovered their motivational type. Such a policy, however, conflicts with
the solution to the adverse selection problem concerning agents’ commitment, which
calls for a steep wage-tenure profile. As a result, unmotivated agents may, despite
their lack of motivation, find it in their best interest to stay at the firm if the wage
profile is sufficiently steep. A solution to this problem is offering an exit bonus after
the initial period, which persuades unmotivated agents to quit. We show that such an
exit bonus is part of a profit-maximizing personnel policy if solving the first adverse
selection problem necessitates a sufficiently steep wage profile and if intrinsic motivation
plays a comparatively minor role.
As pointed out by McFarland (2008), the exit bonus may attract uncommitted
agents. Our analysis validates this concern: we find that the exit bonus can only be a
viable instrument if it is kept secret ex ante. This is so because it would be a perfect
substitute for the wage-tenure profile if it were anticipated. Hence, the principal cannot
resolve both adverse selection problems anymore if agents take into account that they
will be offered an exit bonus later on. Consistent with this, Zappos does not advertise
the exit bonus. While Zappos does confirm its practice in interviews and on its website,
these sources are directed at interested outsiders rather than potential future employees.
Most importantly, there is no mention of the exit bonus in job descriptions or on the
recruitment website (see e.g. Zappos 2013a; the same holds for the companies that
copied Zappos’ policy that we mention above).
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides
an overview of the related literature. Section 2.3 describes the model. Results are
presented and discussed in Section 2.4, followed by a concluding section.
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2.2 Related Literature
The recent attention Zappos and others have received for their practice to pay an exit
bonus (cf. Taylor 2008 and 2014, McFarland 2008, Jeffries 2012, and Edwards 2014)
suggests it is an uncommon, perhaps surprising, policy. We do agree with this no-
tion and only know of a handful of firms using such an instrument. Then again, our
theory predicts that it should not be advertised, so not knowing about firms using an
exit bonus may simply be due to the fact that they try to keep such practices in the
dark. Nonetheless, another closely related phenomenon can be observed in compensa-
tion packages, most prominently in those of executive officers: severance pay. Crucial
differences between the exit bonus offered by Zappos and severance pay packages are
that the former is offered to all recent hires to stimulate voluntary quits, while the
latter are incidentally granted upon involuntary departure of employees. A commonly
used term for severance pay in executive contracts is the Golden Parachute, whereas a
Golden Handshake labels severance pay that is awarded on a discretionary basis. Theo-
retical literature on severance pay explains why it may arise in a principal-agent setting
and what the welfare implications of its introduction are.
Lazear (1990) analyzes effects of a state-mandated severance pay on the labor mar-
ket. His theoretical prediction is that compulsory severance pay should not matter in a
frictionless world: in a competitive labor market, employers will require workers to pay
a fee upfront to offset the expected severance pay. However, this result may be nullified
by, for example, restrictions on the borrowing and lending opportunities of employees.
Lazear’s (1990) empirical analysis of a 22-country panel suggests that the introduction
of severance pay requirements indeed leads to a lower employment rate.
Rather than from legal coercion, severance pay may emerge voluntarily for several
reasons. Much of the theoretical literature incorporates the idea that a risk-neutral
principal offers a form of insurance against unstable income to risk-averse agents. This
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insurance may be provided either by a contract with guaranteed employment (Baily
1974, Gordon 1974, Azariadis 1975, Akerlof and Miyazaki 1980) or by a contract that
warrants severance pay in case of a layoff (Grossman and Hart 1981, Hart and Holm-
strom 1987, Pissarides 2001; see Parsons 2007 for a discussion of the differences between
these two types of insurance). In fact, a focus in this research has been set on explaining
why such insurance is not offered more extensively (see for example Kahn 1985, or Ito
1988). Similar to the insurance argument, Booth and Chatterji (1989) develop a model
in which a worker who partially bears the cost of firm-specific training requires to be
compensated in case of dismissal. It is important to note that the exit bonus we study
is only paid after a voluntary quit, not if the employee is fired. As such, it does not
provide insurance against unemployment. Furthermore, if it were offered for insurance
reasons, it would be advertised and made part of the contract ex ante rather than come
as a surprise.2
Another reason why severance pay could be observed lies in a change of outside
opportunities of the agent. Lazear (1981) considers a setup where principals incentivize
agents to exert effort with a steep wage-tenure profile. A situation may arise where
agents are paid above their marginal product towards the end of their careers. When
an agent receives an unanticipated outside offer, the principal may choose to offer a one-
off payment for efficient separation in lieu of the above-productivity wage. Note that
this payment is made after a voluntary quit, a situation quite similar to that considered
2According to Yermack (2006), severance pay to CEOs is most often granted in the form of a Golden
Handshake. He adds to the insurance argument, possibly in the form of an implicit contract: “In cases
of risk aversion or effort avoidance, CEOs would be more likely to pursue value maximizing strategies
due to the security provided by severance pay” (p. 241). In the case of Golden Parachutes, severance
pay can help to make sure that a CEO does not prevent a take-over of the firm that is in the interest
of the shareholders (cf. Lambert and Larcker 1985). On top of this, Yermack (2006) offers three
more reasons for paying a departing executive: rent extraction – a powerful manager may be able to
expropriate shareholders; ex post settling up – severance pay may be used to compensate a successful
CEO at the end of his career for being underpaid before; and damage control – severance pay may
be made in exchange for a confidentiality or non-litigation agreement by the manager. None of these
arguments seem to bear much relevance in our context.
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in our model. There are two crucial differences though. First, the exit bonus in our
model needs to come as a surprise, whereas in Lazear’s (1981) model it pays off for the
principal to announce that severance pay may be offered after a shock to the agents’
outside options. This is so because the anticipation of a possible severance payment
would make it easier to convince the agent to accept the job. Second, the severance
pay in Lazear (1981) would only occur for agents who are in the later stages of their
careers, whereas the exit bonus that we study is offered to new hires.
Other papers have studied a scenario where a change of market conditions makes an
employer want to reduce the number of employees. Sometimes, simply firing employees
is not possible or prohibitively costly, for example in the public sector, in markets with
strong labor rights, or where (potential) customers may be strongly opposed to large
layoffs. Levy and McLean (1996), Jeon and Laffont (1999), and Rama (1999) deal with
the question of how to reduce the work force in such a situation and all include a form
of severance pay in their analyses.
The paper that comes closest to our approach is that of Inderst and Mueller (2010),
who consider the effect of Golden Parachutes on information revelation by CEOs. As
mentioned above, such agreements are usually only put into effect upon involuntary
departure. Inderst and Mueller (2010), however, argue that the replacement of a CEO
must be incentive compatible for him, because he is often the only person that could
disclose information to the board that would lead to his termination. As such, severance
pay may be used as a tool to make CEOs reveal when they are a bad match to the
firm, in which case they would be fired. The central finding of their theoretical paper
is that steep incentive pay may be a less costly instrument to this end than severance
pay. Our approach differs from Inderst and Mueller’s (2010) in four ways: First, we
assume that the principal cannot make use of a performance measure, thus there is
no way to implement an incentive pay scheme. Instead, the agent’s utility is linked to
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the principal’s profits through intrinsic motivation to exert effort.3 Second, our model
incorporates an additional adverse selection problem at the moment of hiring. We argue
that uncommmitted agents must be deterred from applying, a problem that is less of an
issue when hiring a CEO, as more information about him is available to the principal.
Third, Inderst and Mueller (2010) impose a limited liability constraint, which is not
necessary in our setup. Fourth, we find that the exit bonus needs to be a secret at the
time of hiring.
Finally, our work relates to an emerging literature arguing that full transparency of
personnel policies can be suboptimal. Jehiel (2015) shows that it can pay off for a firm to
leave workers in the dark concerning what performance measures they will be evaluated
on, how their coworkers’ incentive schemes are set up, and what exactly the production
function of the firm is. He finds that non-transparency becomes advisable as soon as
the dimensionality of moral hazard problems is larger than that of one agent’s action
space. The idea behind this is that it may be cheaper for the principal to resolve several
moral hazard problems with one single incentive constraint. In simple words, if a worker
knows his performance will be assessed, but does not know how, he might exert more
effort (see also Lazear 2006 and Ederer et al. 2013 for related arguments). Likewise, Von
Thadden and Zhao (2012) find that it can be a good idea to offer incomplete contracts
concerning the agent’s action space, arguing: “if [...] the employee is unaware of some
shirking behavior, then it may not be optimal [...] to regulate this kind of activity in
the contract, since this makes [him] aware of the activity and necessitates the provision
of costly incentives” (p. 1152).
3As we shall argue in the next section, this fits well with the case of Zappos.
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2.3 The Model
Our model features two periods: Period 1 consists of one term, whereas Period 2 consists
of n terms. At the beginning of Period 1, the principal can hire particular agents if she
offers a wage profile that satisfies their participation constraint and deter other types
of agents from applying with a wage profile that violates their constraint. Agents differ
along three dimensions (commitment, motivation, and outside option), none of which is
readily observable to the principal. The principal’s payoff increases in an agent’s effort
and decreases in his compensation. Agent i’s utility in term t when employed by the
principal is given by
Uit = wt + fi (eit) ,
where wt denotes the wage, and fi (eit) captures the impact on utility of effort eit that
the agent exerts when working for the principal. We avail ourselves of the following
functional form
fi (eit) = γieit − 1
2
θe2it,
which allows for agents to experience a certain joy of work, as long as their motivation
parameter γi is positive. A key assumption in this chapter is that agents only learn the
value of their motivation parameter by working for the principal for one term. Ex ante,
the agent only knows he can be the motivated type, with γ = γ¯ > 0, or the unmotivated
one, with γ = 0; these two cases can occur with probabilities 0 < q < 1 and 1 − q,
respectively. Motivated agents’ incentives are thus partially aligned with those of the
principal, because they enjoy exerting effort to some extent, as in e.g. Benabou and
Tirole (2003), Besley and Ghatak (2005), and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007). The principal
in our model has no means of monitoring effort.4 Hence, an agent’s pay or retainment
4As a matter of fact, Zappos explicitly condemns performance measures; the reasoning behind this
is that employees are supposed to deliver better work, e.g. a friendlier customer service, when they are
not monitored and can act freely (Hsieh 2010).
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cannot be conditioned on his effort. The principal can commit to a wage-tenure profile
and, if she wishes, to offering an exit bonus.
When not working for the principal, agents derive per-term utility Vi, posing another
source of heterogeneity. We allow the outside option utility of agents to be V or V ,
with V > V . The principal has the opportunity to augment the outside option of her
agents in Period 2 by offering an exit bonus b. We rule out indentured servitude; that
is, we assume that b ≥ 0. Furthermore, we assume that the exit bonus comes as a
surprise to agents if the principal decides not to advertise it. Finally, agents differ in
their commitment to the principal: uncommitted agents know for sure they are looking
for employment with the principal for Period 1 only, whereas committed agents are
potentially interested to work for both periods. We assume that the principal wants to
avoid hiring uncommitted agents, for example because of training and other turnover
costs.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Nature draws types.
2. The principal designs a compensation plan consisting of a first period wage, a
second period wage, and possibly an exit bonus, and decides whether to advertise
the exit bonus or not.
3. Agents decide whether to apply for a job with the principal.
4. Agents are hired and make an effort choice for the first period, during which they
learn about their intrinsic motivation to work for the principal. The first period
wage is paid out.
5. The principal decides whether to offer an exit bonus or not.
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6. Agents decide whether to quit or continue working for the principal. Those who
quit enjoy their second period outside option utility and, if it was offered in Stage
5, the exit bonus.
7. Agents who continue make an effort choice for the second period and receive the
second period wage.
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2.4 Analysis
We solve the model by backward induction.
2.4.1 Period 2
At the start of Period 2, each employed agent needs to decide on whether to continue
employment with the principal or to quit, which may depend on his realization of
motivational type. The agent has learned his type in Period 1, so in case he stays at
the firm, makes his effort choice according to whether or not he is motivated. The
unmotivated agent derives utility
Ui2 = n
(
w2 + 0− 1
2
θe2i2
)
,
so he has no reason to put in effort:
ei2 = 0. (2.1)
The motivated agent on the other hand maximizes
Ui2 = n
(
w2 + γ¯ei2 − 1
2
θe2i2
)
,
which yields the following optimal effort level:
ei2 =
γ¯
θ
. (2.2)
Agents decide on whether to continue employment with the principal based on the
realization of their motivation parameter and the wage the principal offers, compared
to their outside opportunities. In the absence of an exit bonus, which will be introduced
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in subsection 2.4.3, a motivated agent stays iff
n
(
w2 +
γ¯2
2θ
)
≥ nVi.
An unmotivated agent, who earns no motivational rents, continues iff
nw2 ≥ nVi.
Hence, the principal should offer w2 < Vi in order to induce all unmotivated agents
with at most outside option utility Vi to quit. As we shall see in Subsection 2.4.3,
this solution to the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ motivation sometimes
conflicts with solving the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment to
the job.
2.4.2 Period 1
At the start of Period 1, agents need to decide whether they find it worthwhile to apply
for the job offered by the principal. This decision is based on the expected utility in
Period 2, the effort choice in Period 1, and the wage profile offered by the principal.
When the agent starts working for the principal, he does not know what motivational
type he is. Since effort is not monitored, effort in Period 1 has no effect on the agent’s
expected utility in Period 2, other than through learning his motivational type (which
happens for any ei1 > 0). Hence, an agent will choose a level of effort that maximizes
his expected utility in Period 1, which is described by:
EUi1 = w1 + q
(
γ¯ei1 − 1
2
θe2i1
)
+ (1− q)
(
0− 1
2
θe2i1
)
= w1 + qγ¯ei1 − 1
2
θe2i1. (2.3)
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Utility maximization yields
ei1 = q
γ¯
θ
. (2.4)
Comparing this result to the effort choices in Period 2, where agents are aware of their
type, it can be seen that the effort choice of the uncertain agent lies in between that of
an unmotivated agent, ei2 = 0, and that of a motivated agent, ei2 =
γ¯
θ . The higher the
probability of being a motivated agent, q, the more effort will be provided to reap the
benefits of that possibility.
Applying at the firm is beneficial to an agent if his expected utility from having the
job exceeds his opportunity costs. The agent is aware of his outside option Vi and knows
when he is uncommitted, i.e. he wants to work in Period 1 only. Using Equations (2.3)
and (2.4), it follows that uncommited agents can be deterred from applying iff
EU1 ≤ Vi ⇐⇒ w1 + q
2γ¯2
2θ
≤ Vi.
Hence, the wage in the first period should be sufficiently low, as in Lazear (1979).
Committed agents decide to apply iff
EU1 + EUi2 ≥ (1 + n)Vi
⇐⇒ w1 + q
2γ¯2
2θ
+ n
(
q
(
w2 +
γ¯2
2θ
)
+ (1− q)max {Vi, w2}
)
≥ (1 + n)Vi, (2.5)
where we have substituted the optimal effort levels described in Equations (2.1), (2.2),
and (2.4). Note that Condition (2.5) implies that, quite naturally, we focus on a case in
which the contract is designed such that agents who find out that they are motivated
expect to continue employment with the principal.5 The unmotivated agents on the
5This is consistent with the principal’s aim to deter uncommitted agents, because she wants (some)
agents to continue employment into Period 2. Note that, if Condition (2.5) is satisfied, motivated
agents prefer to continue: when the second period wage is designed to make an agent apply for the
job before he knows whether he is motivated, he will be happy to continue once he learns that he will
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other hand may choose to quit, but only if their outside option is higher than the wage
paid by the principal in Period 2.
2.4.3 Contract Design
In this subsection we focus on the most interesting case where the principal wants to
deter all – that is, irrespective of their outside options – uncommitted agents from
applying and wants to attract all committed agents. We deal with other possible cases
in Subsection 2.4.4.
The adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment is resolved when the
participation constraint of the uncommitted agents with low outside options is violated
(the participation constraint of the uncommitted agents with high outside options is
then violated too). Hence, the principal sets:6
w1 = V − q
2γ¯2
2θ
. (2.6)
That is, she must make sure the wage in Period 1 does not exceed the lower one of
the outside options, V , net of the expected motivational rent in the first period q
2γ¯2
2θ .
Similarly, the participation constraint for all committed agents will be satisfied when it
is satisfied for the committed agents with a high outside option:
w1 +
q2γ¯2
2θ
+ n
(
q
(
w2 +
γ¯2
2θ
)
+ (1− q)max{V ,w2}) ≥ (1 + n)V . (2.7)
We need to distinguish two cases. We will later derive the conditions under which
each case becomes relevant. In the first case, when Equations (2.6) and (2.7) imply
w2 < V , all unmotivated agents quit after Period 1 and the second period wage is set
earn motivational rents.
6To be sure, the principal could of course also set a lower wage in the first period, and adapt the
second period wage to compensate for this. This does not affect our key results qualitatively.
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at:
w2 = V − γ¯
2
2θ
+
V − V
nq
. (2.8)
That is, the second period wage, which is paid nq times in expected terms, needs to
compensate for the outside option V , but can extract the motivational rents γ¯
2
2θ , while
compensating for the relatively low wage in the first period.
In the second, more interesting, case, where Equations (2.6) and (2.7) necessitate
w2 > V , all agents expect to stay, even those who have discovered in Period 1 that
they are unmotivated.7 The second period wage needed to attract all committed agents
reads:
w2 = V − qγ¯
2
2θ
+
V − V
n
, (2.9)
which, together with the condition w2 > V , implies that for this case to occur, it must
hold that
V − V > nq γ¯
2
2θ
. (2.10)
Very similar to Equation (2.8), the second period wage in this more interesting case, as
described by Equation (2.9), compensates for the outside option, extracts motivational
rents, and compensates for the low wage in Period 1. The only difference is that it
accounts for the fact that now all, even the unmotivated, agents expect to receive it.
Rather than extracting full motivational rents as in the case where only motivated
agents expect to continue, it extracts the expected motivational rents. Likewise, the
compensation for the low first period wage does not need to be as high, because the
expected duration of employment is longer. In this second case, even the unmotivated
agents prefer to remain employed by the principal, the second adverse selection problem.
7We treat the third case, where V < w2 < V , in the next subsection.
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It occurs because the second period payoff exceeds the outside option, even in the
absence of motivational rents. Recall that the principal cannot solve this problem by
reducing the second period wage in exchange for an increase in the first period wage,
as this would contravene the solution to the first adverse selection problem described
by Equation (2.6).
The principal can overcome the adverse selection problem by offering a one-off pay-
ment to all employees that quit at the start of Period 2, the exit bonus b. In order for it
to induce unmotivated agents to leave, it needs to violate their continuation constraint.
She can offer a relatively low exit bonus such that only the unmotivated agents with
high outside opportunities quit, or a higher one that also induces those with low outside
opportunities to leave. We will first analyze the implications of a relatively low exit
bonus. Unmotivated agents with high outside opportunities will quit if the exit bonus
is set such that:
nw2 ≤ nV + b ⇐⇒ b ≥ n
(
w2 − V
)
. (2.11)
When this condition is set binding, some unmotivated agents will self-select and quit,
while all motivated agents will continue because of the motivational rents they earn.
Substituting Equation (2.9) into Equation (2.11) gives after some rewriting:
b = V − V − nq γ¯
2
2θ
. (2.12)
Offering this exit bonus increases the principal’s profits by nw2 − b = nV for each un-
motivated worker who quits.8 Note that Equation (2.12) implies a strictly positive exit
bonus whenever the second adverse selection problem occurs, namely when Condition
(2.10) holds. The outside option dispersion V − V is a representation of the severity
of the first adverse selection problem. If it is large, it is relatively hard to attract all
8Recall that unmotivated workers do not exert effort and, therefore, do not produce any valuable
output for the principal.
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committed agents while deterring all uncommitted agents, thus requiring a steeper wage
profile. This is so because w1 increases in V , whereas w2 decreases in it, while increasing
in V (see Equations (2.6) and (2.9)). Only if this outside option dispersion is larger than
the expected motivational rents earned in Period 2, an exit bonus is useful. This case
becomes less likely when the probability of being the motivated type q or the duration
of the second period n increases. The intuition is that higher expected motivational
rents enable the principal to offer a lower second period wage, thus discouraging the
unmotivated agents to stay. Note that the principal would prefer to pay a negative exit
bonus when Condition (2.10) is violated, that is unexpectedly charge agents who want
to quit. We rule this out, however, by not allowing the principal to deprive agents of
their freedom to leave, i.e. b ≥ 0.
The principal may also choose to offer a higher exit bonus such that all unmotivated
agents quit. This can be achieved by satisfying the following condition:
b ≥ n (w2 − V ) . (2.13)
Once again setting this condition binding and substituting Equation (2.9) yields the
following expression:
b = (1 + n)
(
V − V )− nq γ¯2
2θ
. (2.14)
Offering this exit bonus results in an increase in the principal’s profits of nw2− b = nV
for each unmotivated worker who leaves.9 Quite naturally, this exit bonus deterring all
unmotivated agents from staying exceeds the one in Equation (2.12) by exactly n times
the dispersion in outside opportunities. This is problematic, however, because such a
9Note that this is a smaller amount than in the case of the lower exit bonus analyzed above.
However, more unmotivated workers will accept the offer, which may render the higher exit bonus a
more profitable alternative.
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high exit bonus may also induce some motivated agents to quit. Indeed, motivated
agents with high outside opportunities quit if
b ≥ n
(
w2 +
γ¯2
2θ
− V
)
. (2.15)
Using Equations (2.9) and (2.14), one can see that this condition is met whenever
V − V ≥ γ¯22θ . It follows that, keeping in mind Condition (2.10), the high exit bonus to
deter all unmotivated agents from staying can only be implemented without losing any
motivated agents when nq < 1.10
In summary, we have derived an expression for the first period wage that solves
the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment to the job. In order to
satisfy the participation constraint of the committed agents, a certain second period
wage needs to be offered. Depending on parameters, this wage profile may lead to an
adverse selection problem concerning agents’ motivation. We have shown that an exit
bonus can alleviate the second adverse selection problem.
As long as no motivated agents are encouraged to quit by an exit bonus, it is clearly
optimal to offer it. This is so because the unmotivated agents’ optimal effort choice
is ei2 = 0, yielding no production. Under this assumption it follows immediately from
Equation (2.11) that it is more profitable for the principal to induce some unmotivated
agents to quit by offering the exit bonus, amounting to costs of n(w2− V ), rather than
keeping them and paying out the second period wage n times, amounting to nw2. The
same holds for the exit bonus described by Condition (2.13), provided that Condition
(2.15) is violated so that motivated agents do not quit.
10If nq > 1, designing a contract with a high exit bonus is not profit-maximizing in our framework
for the following reason. Our analysis rests on the assumption that the principal is in need of motivated
agents for Period 2. If she were not interested in keeping the motivated agents with high outside op-
portunities, she could have deterred all agents with high outside opportunities from the very beginning
by offering a lower second period wage (see Subsection 2.4.4).
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Generally speaking, the exit bonus could serve as a form of insurance for the agents
against the possibility to turn out unmotivated. Since this benefits the agents, announc-
ing the exit bonus should enable the principal to save on the wages that need to be
offered.11 However, if the exit bonus were announced, the uncommitted agents could
only be deterred from applying if the first period wage is even lower, namely taking
into account that they will always take advantage of the exit bonus after working for
the first period. Naturally, this requires that the principal set an even higher second
period wage such that committed agents find it worthwhile to apply despite the low
first period wage. Such a high second period wage would in turn necessitate an increase
in the exit bonus in order to induce unmotivated agents to quit, requiring yet another
decrease in the first period wage and so forth. Since the exit bonus and the first period
wage are perfect substitutes for the uncommitted agents, it follows that the principal
cannot solve both adverse selection problems once that agents anticipate an exit bonus.
A formal exposition of this argument is contained in the Appendix. The important
conclusion is that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise, and hence should not be
advertised, in order to function well.
2.4.4 Other cases
The previous section has been confined to the most interesting case where the principal
wants to hire all committed agents and none of the uncommitted agents at the start
of the first period, and where either all or none of the unmotivated agents expect to
quit at the beginning of the second period. Here we briefly deal with the other possible
cases.
11Note that both the principal and the agents are risk-neutral towards income, so insurance could
not lead to a Pareto improvement. Nonetheless, by offering the exit bonus the principal incurs expenses
that are beneficial to the agents, so she should be able to extract these benefits by offering lower wages.
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First, we have so far disregarded the case where V ≤ w2 ≤ V . It implies that
agents who find out that they are unmotivated will quit when they have high outside
opportunities, but expect to stay when their outside option is low. Maintaining the
assumption that the principal wants to attract all committed agents, she chooses to
offer such a second period wage for a certain parameter interval. As in the previous
subsection, the conditions on parameters can be found by substituting the second period
wage.12 After some rewriting, this yields:
nq
nq + 1
γ¯2
2θ
≤ V − V ≤ nq γ¯
2
2θ
.
When the principal is in this situation she may choose to offer an exit bonus in order to
also induce unmotivated agents with low outside opportunities to quit. Naturally, the
principal will offer it after the unmotivated agents with high outside options have left
already. It should then be set at:
b =
1 + nq
q
(
V − V )− n γ¯2
2θ
.
Note that, again, this exit bonus may prompt some motivated agents to quit. As
before, the condition for some motivated agents to quit under this exit bonus would be
V − V > γ¯22θ .
Second, in all cases treated so far, the principal could increase the exit bonus to a
level that prompts some, or even all, motivated agents to quit after Period 1. As noted
in the previous subsection, this would conflict with the assumption that the principal
is in need of motivated agents for Period 2. If she were not interested in employing all
motivated agents in Period 2, but only those with low outside opportunities, she can
offer a wage profile that circumvents the adverse selection problem regarding agents’
12Note that the expression for the second period wage to be used is the same as in Equation (2.8),
the first case treated in the previous subsection.
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motivation. It would consist of a first period wage as described by Equation (2.6) and
a second period wage that is sufficient to induce the motivated agents with low outside
opportunities to stay:
w2 = V − γ¯
2
2θ
.
When offering this second period wage, agents who find out they are not motivated
prefer to quit and no exit bonus is needed.
Third, the principal may wish to tolerate some uncommitted agents in the first
period. She will already attract uncommitted agents with low outside opportunities
by marginally increasing the first period wage. As a consequence, she could decrease
the second period wage while still making the committed agents apply. This, however,
gives the adverse selection concerning agents’ motivation less bite, so the exit bonus
can also be decreased. This process could be continued until the exit bonus reaches its
natural downward boundary b = 0. Thus, when allowing for some uncommitted agents
to apply, she can alleviate the adverse selection problem concerning agents’ motivation
the same way the lower exit bonus would do by offering a simple flat wage:
w1 = w2 = V − q
2 + nq
1 + nq
γ¯2
2θ
.
Note that at this wage profile, uncommitted agents with high outside opportunities still
prefer not to apply.
Last, the principal may wish to hire all agents at the start of the first period. The
principal can do so by offering a first period wage marginally above
w1 = V − q
2γ¯2
2θ
.
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The following second period wage is then sufficient to retain all motivated agents:
w2 = V − γ¯
2
2θ
.
Note that this is less than what is paid in the first period. It is just sufficient to keep
the motivated agents with high outside opportunities from leaving the principal. At the
same time, it may convince all unmotivated agents to quit, namely when V − V < γ¯22θ .
The optimal scheme for the principal will eventually depend on these parameters, the
costs associated with employing uncommitted agents, and the relative mass of agents
with high or low outside opportunities.
2.4.5 Discussion
The key findings of our analysis are twofold. First, using an exit bonus is only optimal
when the outside option dispersion is large and intrinsic motivation plays a compara-
tively minor role. The intuition behind this finding is that keeping out uncommitted
agents necessitates a steep wage profile, in which the wage difference is driven by the
dispersion in outside options. Returning to our motivating example of Zappos, one
could hypothesize that the supply of uncommitted labor is particularly high in a vice
industry-driven economy like Nevada’s (see e.g. The Economist 2010).
The adverse selection problem regarding agents’ motivation, on the other hand, only
becomes pertinent when the wage difference between periods is large compared to the
difference in motivation. Zappos does not offer a salary increase right after training;
however, it has been growing rapidly over the last years and has thus been able to offer
career opportunities that may act in lieu of wage increases (cf. Lazear 1979, Witkin
2012, and Geron 2009).
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The economics literature on intrinsic motivation typically does not focus on low
skilled, repetitive jobs like those of a customer service representative. Taylor (2008),
however, suggests that Zappos has created a work environment in which motivation
plays a role. This relates to its policy of avoiding performance measurement with the
tools common to this industry in favor of having motivated, empowered employees (cf.
Hsieh 2010). While Zappos reportedly creates a pleasant work environment (see e.g.
Fortune 2012 and Glassdoor 2013), the actual tasks of working in customer service
have been shown to be emotionally exhausting (cf. Singh et al. 1994), giving rise
to the notion that a motivated employee may enjoy the job not much more than an
unmotivated employee.
So far, we have only considered the potential effect of the pleasant working conditions
at Zappos on workers’ intrinsic motivation. It may, however, very well be that some
people do find out that they enjoy working at this firm, but at the same time are
not inclined to exert effort. As a consequence, even an employee who finds out to be
unmotivated may, in view of the career opportunities or the pleasant work environment
at Zappos, prefer to remain in the firm. In line with the predictions of our model, this
would be a situation where an employer finds it profit increasing to offer an exit bonus.
Second, we predict that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise to the agents
in order to function well. The question of whether or not potential applicants do
anticipate that Zappos may offer an exit bonus is an empirical one. We do, however,
have reason to believe the exit bonus is not commonly anticipated. While Zappos does
confirm the existence of the exit bonus publicly (see e.g. Hsieh 2010 and Zappos 2013b),
these sources are directed at interested outsiders rather than potential future employees.
Most importantly, there is no mention of the exit bonus in job descriptions or on the
recruitment website (see e.g. Zappos 2013a). Another indication that McFarland’s
(2008) concern about word-of-mouth has not (yet) materialized is that the exit bonus
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is only accepted by a one-digit percentage of new hires (see e.g. Hsieh 2010 and Zappos
2013b). If the exit bonus were anticipated by a large fraction of the local labor force,
one would expect this number to be higher, despite Zappos’ screening efforts.
Furthermore, we have made some conjectures concerning the production function
of the firm and concerning conditions in the labor market that lead to the emergence
of an exit bonus. Zappos asserts to be interested in its employees remaining in the
firm for long periods (cf. Geron 2009), a fact that supports the notion that it is costly
to grant short-term employment, which is the reason why the principal in our model
chooses to deter uncommitted agents from applying. Our model shows that a profit-
maximizing principal in need of some new motivated agents may hire agents with low
outside opportunities and design a flat wage that will prompt agents who find out
that they are unmotivated to quit. If, however, the principal is in need of many new
motivated agents,13 the second period wage needed is ”too high”, such that an exit
bonus emerges. We believe a fast growing firm with a pronounced emphasis on customer
service like Zappos fits this scenario very well.
13Note that the satisfaction of this need comes hand in hand with the necessity to tolerate some
unmotivated agents in the second period, unless nq < 1.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
We have put forward a model that shows under which circumstances a firm may find
it optimal to use exit bonuses to convince intrinsically unmotivated employees to quit.
We show that such a situation may arise when a firm offers a steep wage profile, in our
example due to an adverse selection problem caused by potential job applicants with
a short horizon. In particular, this problem needs to be severe in comparison to the
expected motivational rents earned during an applicant’s career. As a consequence, an
exit bonus is more likely to be offered when potential applicants do not expect to enjoy
working in this particular job too much.
Alternative explanations as to why we observe the exit bonus appear to fail. For
example, the exit bonus may be used by an employer to signal that employees can
earn motivational rents when working for her, rather than as a means to solve the
adverse selection problem concerning agents’ motivation. However, in that case, we
would expect Zappos to advertise the exit bonus actively. The same is true when exit
bonuses are used to solve a commitment problem on the side of the employer. For
instance, an employer may be able to commit to creating a pleasant work environment
by offering an exit bonus. The first adverse selection problem that we identified may
apply here too, making advertised exit bonuses not profit-maximizing.
Indeed, our analysis suggests that an exit bonus must not be advertised. As such,
the exit bonus may be considered an out of equilibrium phenomenon. If offering it
became a common HR practice, our model predicts that it would no longer have the
desired effect. One would have to expect an influx of uncommitted applicants who are
(only) interested in receiving the exit bonus after a short training period. This would
require increasing screening efforts by HR departments to filter out such job candidates
which – at least in some environments – may not be feasible or prohibitively costly.
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An analogy to the dynamics described above can be found in a rather delicate area:
In 2012, Switzerland started to offer Tunisian asylum seekers money if they decide
to return to their country of origin (cf. NZZ 2012).14 Applications for asylum from
Tunisian citizens are rarely accepted in the Swiss Confederation and refugees are only
eligible for the “return assistance” before their application for asylum has been decided
on. It could be argued that the information structure in this example is comparable
to that in our model. Applicants have private information on their chances to receive
refugee status, and are willing to await the ruling in the relatively bad living conditions
of an asylum seeker (cf. Hatton 2004). If offered money upon return, some applicants
may decide to return, namely those who are relatively “unmotivated”, because they
deem their chances of being accepted as low. Just as in our setup, it is crucial that
this policy is not widely known. Otherwise, one could expect refugee numbers to rise,
or even non-immigrants starting to apply for asylum in the hope of receiving a return
assistance.
The motivation to develop the model presented in this chapter originated in an
observation of one single firm. Even though several other firms have followed Zappos’
lead in the meanwhile, this could raise concerns about the relevance of the HR policy we
analyze. We can, however, conceive a few arguments to put the scarcity of observations
into perspective. While it is of course possible that using an exit bonus is not profit
maximizing, our model yields conditions under which its use would be the optimal
strategy. It may be that these conditions are just not satisfied at other firms. Secondly,
other firms may simply not be aware of this innovation in compensation policies. This is
supported by the attention that Zappos and the other tech firms’ conduct has received
14Note that Switzerland and other countries offer several forms of return assistance to refugees and
other migrants (see e.g. Swiss Confederation 2015, Rijksoverheid 2015, or UK Border Agency 2014).
The Swiss program for Tunisian asylum seekers, however, exposes most parallels to our study.
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in the press.15 Finally, a key result of our analysis is that the exit bonus needs to come
as a surprise. In light of this, it may very well be that firms use tools such as exit
bonuses without outsiders knowing about it.
15We also note an increased academic interest in pay-to-quit schemes, see e.g. the experimental
study by Harris (2015).
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2.A Appendix
In Subsection 2.4.3 we have given an intuitive account as to why the exit bonus must
not be anticipated by the agents. Formally, the argument runs as follows. With an
anticipated exit bonus, the first period wage must fulfill the following condition in
order to still deter all uncommitted agents from applying:
w1 ≤ V − b− q
2γ¯2
2θ
(2.16)
When the principal advertises the exit bonus, it becomes common knowledge that it will
always be set such that at least the unmotivated agents with high outside opportunities
leave after Period 1. As a result, the overall participation constraint of the committed
agents collapses to:
w1 +
q2γ¯2
2θ
+ n
(
q
(
w2 +
γ¯2
2θ
)
+ (1− q)
(
V+
b
n
))
≥ (1 + n)V .
Combined with Equation (2.16), this gives us the following expression for the second
period wage:
w2 ≥ (1 + n)V
nq
− w1
nq
− 1
nq
q2γ¯2
2θ
− 1− q
q
(
V +
b
n
)
− γ¯
2
2θ
⇒ w2 = 1 + nq
nq
V − w1
nq
−
( q
n
+ 1
) γ¯2
2θ
− 1− q
nq
b, (2.17)
where the equality sign follows from profit-maximization by the principal. So, in com-
parison to the previously found expressions, the principal can indeed extract the ex-
pected value of exit bonus payments 1−qnq b in the second period wage. Finally, the exit
bonus needs to violate the continuation constraint of the committed unmotivated agents
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with high outside opportunities:
b ≥ n (w2 − V ) .
Using Equation (2.17), it follows that:
b = n
(
1 + nq
nq
V − w1
nq
− q + n
n
γ¯2
2θ
− (1− q)
nq
b− V
)
⇐⇒ b = V − w1 − q (q + n) γ¯
2
2θ
.
Setting Condition (2.16) binding, we get an expression for w1 that we substitute:
b = V − V + b+ q
2γ¯2
2θ
− q (q + n) γ¯
2
2θ
⇐⇒ 0 = V − V − nq γ¯
2
2θ
.
That is, the exit bonus cannot be set optimally anymore. An announced exit bonus b
and the first period wage w1 become perfect substitutes so that it is impossible to solve
both adverse selection problems at once.
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3.1 Introduction
One of the central questions in corporate governance is how to align the incentives of
the CEO with those of the owners of a firm. An apparent method to do so is tying
the executive’s compensation to corporate performance, for example by means of equity
pay or a bonus based on accounting measures.1 Previous studies confirm that CEO pay
is indeed related to firm performance and find total CEO wealth to increase by median
values of 3.25 dollars (Jensen and Murphy 1990) or 5.29 dollars (Hall and Liebman
1998) following a 1,000 dollar increase in shareholder wealth.2 Not only do the level
and the composition of executive compensation vary greatly across firms and industries
(cf. Murphy 1999), but they also change quite remarkably over time (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Components of CEO Compensation
Level and structure of CEO Compensation in S&P 500 firms, in thousands of year-2000 dollars
(Source: Frydman and Jenter 2010).
Investors care about the return on their investment in a firm, that is, the sum of stock
1Executive compensation packages can generally consist of a number of parts: a base salary, an
annual bonus based on accounting measures, stock options, long-term incentive plans such as restricted
stock plans, and other benefits such as perquisites, insurances, pensions, or severance pay.
2These studies focus on changes in executive wealth rather than just on income in order to take
into account the effect of corporate performance on the CEO’s equity holdings.
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price changes and paid dividends, relative to the principal investment. Assuming the
CEO disposes of means to reduce his company’s tax obligations and that the expected
gains of such conduct exceed the expected costs for the shareholders, it would be rational
for the owners of a firm to set corresponding incentives for top management. Dyreng
et al. (2008) note that “[a]voiding taxes does not imply anything improper. Indeed,
firms (and individuals) can avoid Federal [sic] income taxes through means as simple as
holding municipal bonds that generate tax-exempt interest income” (p. 65). Apart from
making use of such tax exemptions, firms may reduce their tax burden by exploiting
differences in local tax rates, by financing themselves with debt rather than equity, or
simply by misreporting revenue or business expenses.3 If the CEO can avail himself of
such a measure to reduce tax payments, an apparent question is how the shareholders
can effectively encourage such behavior.4
Firms can ensure that the CEO acts in the shareholders’ interest by making him a
shareholder himself (for example by paying him in firm equity and limiting his possibility
to sell it). Nonetheless, according to Murphy (1999) almost all for-profit companies
make use of bonuses in addition to or instead of equity incentives. Assuming the stock
price correctly evinces the value of a firm, equity incentives implicitly motivate the
CEO to reduce corporate tax payments, since this will lead to a higher net income of
the company, and thus to a higher firm value. However, it is unclear whether bonus
contracts set such incentives. This depends on what accounting measure a bonus is
based on. The literature suggests that the most prevalent performance measure used
in bonus contracts is firm profits. Murphy (2000) finds 91% of large firms to tie the
CEO’s bonus to either net or gross accounting profits. Ittner et al.’s (1997) text-search
of proxy statements only finds 25.3% of firms to use pre-tax and 27.2% post-tax income
3Corporate tax rates do not only vary internationally, but also between states and municipalities.
4The analysis in this chapter is largely independent of the question of whether or not a firm’s tax
sheltering activities are legal. When a distinction needs to be made, tax avoidance refers to lawful
conduct, whereas tax evasion refers to an illegal activity.
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as performance measures. It must be noted, however, that other measures can indirectly
set incentives to increase profits and/or reduce taxes.5
In this chapter, I test empirically whether CEOs’ bonus payments are related to
corporate income taxes. I do so by running regressions of bonus payments on income
taxes, controlling for firms’ net profits. While public corporations are required to dis-
close the amount and composition of executive compensation, the exact remuneration
contract is generally unobserved. Studies on managerial bonus contracts therefore rely
on information that some firms communicate voluntarily, for example in their proxy
statements. I add to the literature in two ways. First, I make use of panel data with a
sample of firms that is much broader than that in other studies which are constrained by
the number of firms for which enough information is available. This approach gives this
study more external validity. Second, the approach of estimating the nature of bonus
contracts, rather than conducting a survey or otherwise making use of information con-
trolled by the firm, allows us to rule out concerns such as nonresponse bias, selection
bias, and even firms or their consultants intentionally giving misleading information
(cf. Slemrod 2007). The next section provides an overview of the related literature.
Section 3.3 describes the data and the econometric framework. Results are presented
and discussed in Section 3.4, followed by a concluding section.
5According to Ittner et al. (1997) and Murphy (2000), other popular financial performance measures
in bonus plans are earnings per share, return on equity, sales, cash flow, return on assets, and cost
reduction.
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3.2 Related Literature
If corporate income taxes were determined in an inexorable fashion, there would be little
justification for conducting this study. However, recent research suggests that compa-
nies have an array of possibilities to manipulate their income tax payments, both legally
and illegally. This section summarizes three streams of literature, beginning with some
theoretic implications of including tax considerations in a principal-agent framework.
The second group of studies aims at investigating whether firms pay less taxes when the
CEO is incentivized accordingly, which further motivates this study. Finally, I derive
some indications for the empirical analysis from two papers that examine what kind of
firms engage in income tax sheltering.
Theory of Incentives to Avoid Taxes
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) develop a model of individual tax evasion based on
Becker’s (1968) notion that a person will commit an unlawful act whenever the expected
utility from doing so exceeds the expected disutility of punishment. In a corporate set-
ting ownership and control are separated, making the problem more complex. Crocker
and Slemrod (2005) use a costly state falsification framework in the formalization of
the contract between shareholders and the executive, in which the executive can avoid
corporate taxes legally (costless) or engage in illegal tax evasion (costly to shareholders
and executive).6 The degree to which he can avoid taxes is a random variable and pri-
vate information for him. The central finding of the model is that tax evasion decreases
with higher penalties to either shareholders or the executive, but that penalizing the
executive is generally more effective. This is so because the information asymmetry
concerning the possibilities of tax avoidance necessitates a second-best compensation
6Crocker and Slemrod (2005) base their arguments on the contract of the Chief Financial Officer
(CFO). While the CFO may have a more direct say in a firm’s tax issues, Phillips (2003) and Dyreng et
al. (2010) support the view that focussing on the CEO can be justified with his predominant position
in the company.
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contract. Note that Crocker and Slemrod (2005) assume not only the shareholders but
also the executive to be risk-neutral agents.
This last concern is addressed by Chen and Chu (2005) who model the executive
to be risk-averse. Unlike Crocker and Slemrod (2005), they further assume that the
firm owners can observe whether or not tax evasion is carried out. When tax evasion
is detected by the authorities, the CEO incurs a cost.7 However, firm owners cannot
credibly condition the compensation contract on whether or not tax evasion is detected,
because the contract would not hold up in court.8 As a consequence, the shareholders
must reward the executive for tax evasion ex ante, regardless of whether or not it is
detected and punished. While this signifies an efficiency loss compared to a scenario
where detection is contractable, it may still be worthwhile for firm owners to incentivize
tax evasion.
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a model that incorporates the two following
considerations: 1) Incentive compensation aligns the executive’s incentives with those
of the shareholders, so that he tries to reduce tax payments whenever this increases firm
value. 2) Tax sheltering and managerial rent extraction are complementary activities.
Thus, it is unclear whether incentive compensation leads to an aggressive tax strategy
or not.
Do such Incentives Work?
One commonly used measure of the extent of tax sheltering is the book-tax gap: the
difference between income reported to shareholders (as laid out in the United States
7The paper also studies the case of a non-liable CEO, which I do not discuss for the sake of brevity.
8The relevance of this argument can be questioned, however. First of all, it does not play a role
in legal tax evasion. Second, the CEO may enforce the payment of higher compensation when illegal
evasion is detected, for example by threatening to disclose other information that is harmful to the
shareholders.
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and that reported to tax authorities. An-
other, very similar, approach is to look at the effective tax rate (ETR) of a firm which
is equal to the ratio of cash taxes to pretax income. In their empirical application with
Compustat and ExecuComp data from the years 1993 to 2002, Desai and Dharmapala
(2006) find that higher stock-based compensation is associated with a lower level of
tax sheltering, as measured by the book-tax gap that does not stem from accounting
accruals. They argue that this negative effect is driven by poorly-governed firms, for
which the authors assume that there is a positive feedback between diversion of funds
and tax sheltering, in other words: an increase in the manager’s participation in firm
value will lead him to divert less funds, which, in weakly-governed firms, is assumed to
make tax sheltering more costly.9
Rego and Wilson (2012), on the contrary, state that for an executive to follow an
aggressive tax strategy, high levels of equity risk incentives need to be put in place. They
argue that if the CEO holds stock options of his firm, their value increases with stock
return volatility so that he is incentivized to undertake risky activities with a positive
net present value; one such risky activity may be an aggressive tax strategy. Using data
from Compustat, ExecuComp, and CRSP for the years 1992 to 2006, Rego and Wilson
(2012) find a positive relationship between several measures of tax aggressiveness, such
as discretionary book-tax differences or the average ETR, and the manager’s equity
risk incentives, which are modeled as the change in the value of stock options held by
the CEO. Similar in spirit, Armstrong et al. (2012) make use of a proprietary data set
from a human resource consultant for the years 2002 to 2006 and find a positive relation
between several measures of tax sheltering and the compensation mix. They define this
9They offer a case study to illustrate the intuition of such a positive feedback mechanism between tax
sheltering and diversion of funds, stating that “features of [a tax-oriented] transaction designed to make
it more opaque to the capital markets were justified on the basis of secrecy, supposedly necessitated by
tax objectives” and that “actions that served as the origins of the conspiracy to mislead the auditors
were also justified on this same basis” (p. 157).
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variable as the ratio of variable compensation to total compensation.10 While this can
serve as an approximation of the intensity of the manager’s general incentivation, it is
unclear what part of it puts it in the executive’s interest to reduce his firm’s income
tax payments.
In summary, the empirical evidence on whether equity risk incentives can induce
corporate tax sheltering is unclear. Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) analysis can serve
as one explanation why shareholders cannot always rely on equity incentives to encour-
age a reduction of the tax burden. As a result, they may choose to resort to bonus
contracts that incentivize management to run an aggressive tax strategy. Another ex-
planation could be that shareholders choose a bonus plan to set these incentives because
accounting measures are a less noisy signal of managerial actions than the stock price
(cf. Murphy 1999).
Focussing on accounting-based compensation, Phillips (2003) investigates if after-
tax incentives – that is, compensation that is based on an after-tax accounting measure
– lead executives to conduct a more aggressive tax strategy. Using a combination
of Compustat and proprietary survey data, he estimates a two step model with the
firm’s ETR and dummy variables indicating whether the corresponding executives are
remunerated based on after-tax measures as endogenous variables. The undertaken
survey allows him to include not only an indicator variable for the CEO’s compensation,
but also for that of business unit managers within the firm. It was sent to 829 firms,
of which 209 yielded usable data, but the author states that (unreported) descriptive
statistics suggest that there is no nonresponse bias as measurable with some observable
variables. The surveyed firms do, however, significantly differ from the whole sample of
10Note that this approach is similar to that of Desai and Dharmapala (2006), even though it yields
contrary results. The difference is that Desai and Dharmapala (2006) use the ratio of stock options to
total compensation, rather than the ratio of variable compensation (stock options and bonus) to total
compensation.
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Compustat firms in terms of size, capital intensity, leverage, and ETR. Having about
two-thirds of CEOs and one third of business unit managers compensated based on
after-tax measures, he finds that this leads to a lower ETR in the case of business unit
managers, but not for CEOs.
Phillips (2003) does, however, postulate that when the CEO considers the tax de-
partment as a profit center, he will hence make sure that the business unit managers also
have the proper incentives. Dyreng et al. (2010) also note that CEOs may indirectly
influence corporate tax policy by “setting the tone at the top” (p. 1164). Gaertner
(2013) offers an alternative explanation for the lack of a relationship between CEOs’
after-tax incentives and ETRs in Phillips’ (2003) study: low statistical power. Gaert-
ner (2013) overcomes this problem by hand-collecting information on whether or not a
CEO receives incentives on an after-tax basis from companies’ proxy statements. This
generates a larger sample than that in Phillips’ (2003) study and comes about with
higher statistical power. Gaertner’s (2013) analysis yields two main results. First, he
does indeed find a negative relation between companies’ ETRs and the use of after-tax
incentives in CEO compensation. Second, he shows that CEO cash compensation is
higher in firms that set after-tax incentives, ceteris paribus. He rationalizes this result
with an increased risk for the CEO, for which he demands to be compensated.
Which Firms Avoid Taxes?
Turning to the question of which firms engage in tax sheltering, Dyreng et al. (2008)
find that while the average firm in their 1995 to 2004 Compustat sample hardly reduces
its tax burden below the statutory tax rate of 35 percent, about a fifth of these firms
do so by maintaining an ETR of less than 20 percent. Their exploratory analysis yields
1) that these tax-avoiders are concentrated in service industries and in oil and gas
extraction and 2) that large firms with incorporation in a tax haven, a high ratio of
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physical capital, or high leverage tend to have a lower ETR. However, they leave out
the question of whether and how CEOs are incentivized to produce these outcomes.
Atwood et al. (1998) analyze a cross section of Compustat data and conduct a
text-search of the corresponding proxy statements. They generate a binary variable
indicating whether the bonus determinants mentioned in the proxy statements are pre-
tax or post-tax measures and aim to explain this variation in the choice of performance
indicators with the firms’ tax planning opportunities. Firms that employ “earnings”,
“net income”, “return on assets”, or “return on equity” as performance measures are
considered to give after-tax incentives, with all other cases considered to induce before-
tax incentives. Note that firms which use both before- and after-tax indicators are
dropped from the sample. In their 1993-data, roughly two-thirds of the 406 firms
employ after-tax measures, with the rest using before-tax accounting measures. Their
results suggest that bigger, international, more capital intense, more diverse, and less
levered firms have more means of manipulating tax obligations and are hence more
likely to employ net rather than gross performance measures. The rationale behind
the effect of these firm characteristics on tax planning opportunities and thus on the
performance measure choice is as follows:
• Size: the bigger a firm is (measured in total sales or total assets), the higher are
potential savings from proactive tax planning. As an example, consider a small
firm whose total tax burden is so low that incentivizing the CEO to reduce it
would be too costly.11
• Multinational Operations: international firms can allocate their income-
generating processes to jurisdictions with lower corporate taxes.
11This argument requires a non-linear relationship between scale and the costs of tax reduction, for
example a fixed cost.
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• Capital Intensity: while a general investment tax credit has been abolished in the
United States in 1986, firms that use relatively much capital in their operations
have more tax planning opportunities “due to timing issues regarding asset acqui-
sitions, asset dispositions and differences in the tax consequences of buying versus
leasing” (Atwood et al. 1998, p. 31) and because they can exploit differences in
local and state taxes.12
• Diversity: firms with more operating segments have the opportunity to offset
gains in one business unit with losses in another.
• Leverage: using debt instead of equity reduces the tax burden because interest
payments generally are a deductible business expense (cf. Internal Revenue Ser-
vice 2013b). Atwood et al. (1998) argue that a high-levered firm will hardly
have any leeway to further reduce tax payments, since the high deductions from
interests exhaust the possibilities to lower taxes.
They also include inventory intensity (inventory per total assets) and 5 industry dum-
mies in their regression, out of which only the coefficient for the service industry is
significant: service providers seem to be more likely to employ after-tax performance
measures.
While these studies give some insight for the design of the empirical analysis, they
might be subject to a selection bias. One could for example argue that it is in the
interest of the firms which incentivize their CEOs to reduce corporate tax payments to
avoid that their conduct becomes public knowledge: if the tax authorities know that a
firm sets incentives to keep taxes low, they might tend to increase auditing efforts at
that particular firm. As a consequence, firms that actively encourage their managers
to keep taxes low might be the same ones that give inconclusive information in their
12Furthermore, several investment tax credit programs still exist to implement public policy goals,
such as renewable energy investment tax credits (cf. Internal Revenue Service 2013).
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proxy statements (cf. Atwood et al. 1998 who had to drop 266 of their initial 672
observations), leading to a selective sample.
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3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
I test empirically whether managerial bonus payments are related to corporate income
taxes, holding constant net profits. I do so by making use of a merged dataset on
executive compensation and firm characteristics. A brief discussion of the dataset is
given in Subsection 3.3.1, and the estimation approach is laid out in Subsection 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Compustat and ExecuComp Data
For the analysis I employ a dataset that was compiled from Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s)
Compustat and ExecuComp databases. The majority of the firms for which ExecuComp
data is available are listed in the S&P 1500 index. While it could be argued that
the focus on such a dataset limits the generalizability of my results, I aim to offer
an improvement over similar studies that were described in the last section; not only
does the S&P 1500 represent some 90% of the United States market capitalization (cf.
Standard & Poor’s 2014), but it also lets us draw inferences concerning smaller firms,
since it is comprised of the S&P 500 (large-cap firms), the S&P 400 (mid-cap firms),
and the S&P 600 (small-cap firms). In accordance with the literature (Phillips 2003,
Desai and Dharmapala 2006, Rego and Wilson 2012), I limit the analysis to firms with
positive pre-tax income.13 I further drop all firms that are not incorporated in the
United States in order to ensure a common institutional framework for all analyzed
firms. Finally, I discard observations that have a missing value for any of the variables
that I use in the remainder of this chapter so that all estimations are undertaken with
the same sample. This yields a dataset on 2,830 firms for the years 1992 to 2010, with
some firms not covered in all years, yielding 21,921 datapoints. The sample attrition is
documented in the Appendix.
13Note that we may still observe negative post-tax income.
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A first overview of the variables used in the analysis is offered in Table 3.1, stating
their means and ranges. The dependent variable bonus represents the total annual bonus
paid to the CEO and is measured in thousands of dollars. Both explanatory variables
are measured in millions of dollars and have been corrected for bonus expenses: income,
the firm’s net income, and incometax, the corresponding corporate income tax.14 All
firms have been matched to an industry according to four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes; when these were unavailable an industry has been assigned
based on the Compustat variable industry or, if unavailable too, on information from
the company website. The dummy variable foreign indicates whether or not a firm
generates income abroad. I further generate indicators based on the variables size, the
firm’s total assets, capitalintensity, the ratio of total property, plant, and equipment
to total assets, and leverage, the ratio of debt to total assets.
Table 3.2 gives the means of the three key variables in subsamples based on different
categories. It shows that bigger firms tend to have higher net profits and pay higher
bonuses. The average bonus, however, increases relatively less than income, which could
be an indication that the sensitivity of the bonus to net income decreases with firm size.
Consistent with Murphy (1999), we can see notable differences between industries in
terms of bonus, income, and incometax. The average firm in the Oil and Gas industry,
for example, pays its CEO a bonus almost twice the size than its counterpart in the
Software industry, while their net income is comparable. Interestingly, they also pay
much lower taxes. Firms that generate income abroad have almost double the net
income of domestic-only firms, while paying a higher bonus and relatively more taxes.15
Highly-levered firms pay relatively less taxes in comparison with lowly-levered firms,
while paying a higher bonus. With their net income almost exactly the same, firms
14The procedure for correcting for bonus expenses is documented in the Appendix.
15Note that this does not contradict Atwood et al.’s (1998) argument that firms with foreign oper-
ations have higher tax saving opportunities. An unobserved characteristic may cause these firms to
have a high tax burden, while still having many opportunities for tax savings.
Table 3.1: Means and Ranges of Variables, n=21921
Variable Mean SD Min Max
bonus 900 1694 0 76951
income 372 1284 -1130 45223
incometax 65 317 -396 10655
Agriculture and Mining 0.012 1.720 0 1
Communication 0.024 0.148 0 1
Construction 0.012 0.104 0 1
Electrics and Electronics 0.092 0.281 0 1
Financial Institutions 0.094 0.296 0 1
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 0.033 0.178 0 1
Manufacturing 0.031 0.178 0 1
Oil and Gas 0.029 0.163 0 1
Other Industrials 0.238 0.429 0 1
Other Services 0.090 0.281 0 1
Real Estate 0.001 0.030 0 1
Software 0.056 0.237 0 1
Vehicles 0.030 0.178 0 1
Transportation 0.060 0.237 0 1
Utilities 0.066 0.252 0 1
Wholesale and Retail 0.132 0.341 0 1
foreign 0.472 0.503 0 1
size 10181 53989 0.148 2187631
capitalintensity 0.544 0.400 0 5.876
leverage 0.224 0.192 0 2.616
Table 3.2: Conditional Means, n=21921
Subsample bonus income incometax
Small Firms 282.81 24.37 2.96
Medium-sized Firms 727.11 114.72 17.74
Large Firms 1874.00 1233.36 221.77
Agriculture and Mining 975.34 188.47 26.61
Communication 1803.71 975.65 175.25
Construction 2839.34 192.54 13.76
Electrics and Electronics 699.25 290.58 55.73
Financial Institutions 1712.16 632.62 49.69
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 1235.17 681.45 97.73
Manufacturing 629.50 317.67 19.27
Oil and Gas 1102.80 348.51 43.81
Other Industrials 817.51 454.98 101.73
Other Services 719.96 118.30 17.04
Real Estate 1698.86 202.14 19.21
Software 654.45 358.84 102.31
Vehicles 1117.69 511.10 91.15
Transportation 598.66 147.83 37.10
Utilities 526.39 284.37 76.15
Wholesale and Retail 718.37 247.14 29.59
No Foreign Income 783.36 251.20 37.35
Foreign Income 1036.44 506.82 96.07
Low Leverage 822.47 349.01 63.38
High Leverage 982.34 394.36 66.71
Low Capitalintensity 1005.18 372.51 56.50
High Capitalintensity 806.83 371.09 73.04
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with a low capital intensity also pay a higher bonus and less taxes than companies with
a high capital intensity.16
Note that these are univariate comparisons and that the differences in averages could
also be driven by level effects. It may be that larger firms pay a relatively lower bonus
because they can incentivize their CEOs more easily, either because the prospect of a
certain absolute amount of bonus payments suffices, or because equity incentives are
provided. It may just as well be the case that the relatively low bonus can be explained
as a punishment for relatively high tax payments. Likewise, unobserved heterogeneity
within an industry, or even within a firm, may necessitate a certain level of bonus
payments. A regression framework with fixed firm effects allows me to relate variations
in the bonus to variations in firm income and income taxes, rather than only comparing
the levels of averages.
3.3.2 Econometric Framework
Each firm in the dataset has its own executive compensation plan and ideally one would
be able to make inferences about each individual bonus plan. Unfortunately, there are
less than eight observations per firm on average, not allowing me to do this.17 I thus
resort to estimating a model that lets me make statements about the average bonus
contract and later refine the analysis by focussing on several subsamples. The baseline
specification controls for time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant time effects:
bonusit = β1incomeit + β2incometaxit + λi + λt + εit, (3.1)
16Idem. High capital intensity may come about with higher average income taxes and thereby give
more leeway to manipulate taxes.
17Note that in one of his robustness checks, Gaertner (2013) generates a variable indicating whether
a firm uses after-tax incentives with this very technique. Due to the low number of observations,
however, he needs to resort to an uncommon threshold of significance.
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where bonusit denotes the realization of the bonus paid to the CEO by firm i in
year t, incomeit the firm’s net income before extraordinary expenses in that year, and
incometaxit the corresponding tax.
The company fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity that influences the
level of bonuses in a particular firm. Macroeconomic and other factors that might affect
the bonus in all firms in a given year are controlled for by the time effects.
We can now easily test the following hypothesis:
H0:
β2 = 0,
holding net income constant, the bonus does not depend on corporate income taxes.
The coefficient β2 tells us the impact of the firm’s income tax payments on the
CEO’s bonus, holding constant firm income. If firm profits are taxed linearly, the
regression framework would not allow us to deduce statements on this effect, since
both explanatory variables would be perfectly collinear. Now, if we do find β2 to be
significantly different from zero, this is only caused by variations in incometax that
arise independently of those in income. As an example, consider a firm who pays
a bonus based only on net income. Now further assume that gross profits increase
simultaneously with a raise in the tax rate such that net profits remain exactly the
same. As a consequence, the CEO bonus remains unchanged while there was a change
in incometax, yielding a coefficient estimate of β2 = 0. If this weren’t the case, we
could deduce that the bonus must be tied to other measures than just net income, for
example to gross income, to another measure that correlates with it, or even explicitly
to tax payments themselves.
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The following combinations of coefficient estimates appear to be conceivable:
• β1 = 0; β2 = 0: it cannot be shown that CEO bonus payments are associated
with either corporate net income or corporate tax payments.
• β1 > 0; β2 = 0: while firms do incentivize their CEOs to increase net income, the
null hypothesis that the CEO bonus is independent of corporate tax payments
cannot be rejected.
• β1 > 0; β2 > 0; β1 ≥ β2: firms set incentives related to a mixture of pre-tax and
post-tax corporate income.
• β1 > 0; β2 < 0: in addition to rewarding increases in net rather than in gross
income, the firm sets further incentives to reduce corporate tax payments.
My conjecture based on previous studies would be that we find a coefficient on
incometax that is lower than that of income. Note that this would be an average
result and would not mean it applies to all firms. While it might be possible that some
firms mix pre- and post-tax incentives in their bonus contracts, I expect firms to use
either one, possibly in combination with other incentives to reduce taxes. I will explore
whether there are any regularities concerning the coefficient estimates conditional on
observable firm characteristics with the following specification:
bonusijt =
∑
j
β1j∗subsamplej∗incomeijt+
∑
j
β2j∗subsamplej∗incometaxijt+λij+λt+εijt.
(3.2)
The sample is divided into subsamples based on industry and size. For the sake
of easier interpretation in a multivariate comparison of the coefficients of income and
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incometax, let us reformulate Equation (3.2) to:
bonusijt = β11 ∗ incomei1t + β21 ∗ incometaxi1t +
∑
j "=1 β1j ∗ subsamplej ∗ incomeijt
+
∑
j "=1 β2j ∗ subsamplej ∗ incometaxijt + λij + λt + εijt, (3.3)
where the subsamples are generated based on tax planning opportunities in terms of
foreign operations, leverage, size, and capital intensity. The reference subsamples are
denoted by j = 1.
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3.4 Results
This section exhibits the results obtained from regressing CEO bonus payments on the
corresponding firms’ net income and corporate income tax. The first subsection presents
the results of the baseline specification and its extensions, followed by a discussion of
possible limitations in Subsection 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Baseline Specification and Extensions
In this subsection, I present the results from estimating Equations (3.1), (3.2), and
(3.3). The baseline regression yields the following results (Table 3.3):
Table 3.3: Baseline Specification, n=21921
Explanatory Variable Coefficient
income 0.338***
(0.013)
incometax -0.258***
(0.052)
Firm and Year effects Yes
Number of Firms 2830
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant time
effects. The sample period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are in parentheses and significance
at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The results displayed in Table 3.3 imply that a one million dollar increase in a firm’s
net income is associated with an increase in the CEO’s bonus of 338 dollars.18 They
further allow us to reject the hypothesis that tax payments do not play a role in any
18This estimate for the sensitivity of the bonus to firm income is considerably smaller than the
estimates for the sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder wealth which were mentioned in the In-
troduction. Note that the bonus only accounts for a part of annual compensation and that it is a
flow variable, whereas CEO wealth is a stock variable, comprising all previous stock and option grants
among other elements. Furthermore, the value of these equity incentives is tied per definition to the
stock yield, and thus to shareholder wealth, whereas the bonus can depend on various measures.
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CEO’s bonus contract: holding net income constant, a reduction of payable taxes by
one million dollars comes about with a 258 dollar increase in the executive’s bonus.
This is a noteworthy result since it implies that shareholders reward an income increase
that comes from tax savings more strongly than other net income increases. A possible
explanation is that CEOs require to be compensated for the additional risk borne in
tax sheltering activities (cf. Chen and Chu 2005, and Rego and Wilson 2012). Bonus
contracts that are based on more than one performance measure are often designed in
an additive fashion so that they can be thought of as a sum of separate bonus plans (cf.
Murphy 1999). The coefficient estimates could be the result of such an additive bonus
plan. Firms might, for example, base part of the bonus on net income and explicitly
reward a reduction of corporate taxes in another part of the bonus.19 Whatever the
case may be, this is still an average result and the literature presented above suggests
that firms’ compensation practices differ across a number of variables.
Table 3.4: Subsamples: Firm Size, n=21921
Subsample income incometax
Small Firms 3.241*** 1.980
(0.816) (3.725)
Medium-sized Firms 0.978*** -0.407
(0.113) (0.705)
Large Firms 0.337*** -0.251***
(0.013) (0.052)
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant
time effects. Medium-sized firms are the 50% of firms around the median firm in terms of size
measured by total assets. Small firms and large firms are the smallest and largest 25% of firms
in terms of total assets, respectively. The sample period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are
in parentheses and significance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *,
respectively.
19Ittner et al. (1997) find that some 8% of bonus plans reward “cost reduction”, which may comprise
tax expenses.
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Following Equation (3.2), I estimate the coefficients for income and incometax sep-
arately for subsamples based on firm size and industry. Table 3.4 depicts the results
for the subsamples based on firm size and lets us draw two conclusions: 1) The larger
a firm is, the lower is the sensitivity of the bonus to the firm’s net income. While a one
million dollar increase in net income leads to a bonus increase of 3241 dollars for small
firms, the same increase in net income only leads to a bonus increase of 337 dollars
for large firms. 2) Holding net income constant, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
tax payments do not affect the bonus in small and medium-sized firms – it seems that
CEOs in these companies are simply compensated based on net profits and taxes do
not play a role. Apparently, the results from the baseline specification are driven by
large firms, in which a one million dollar increase is associated with a 251 dollar bonus
increase.
We now repeat the analysis for different industries (Table 3.5). As was put forward
by Murphy (1999), there is quite some heterogeneity between the coefficient estimates
for the different industries. The results can be grouped into four categories:
• Positive income, insignificant incometax coefficients:20 While a higher net income
is accompanied by a higher bonus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, that is,
we have no reason to believe tax payments have an impact on the CEO’s bonus
– over and above their direct effect on net income – for firms in the Agriculture
and Mining, Communication, Food, Beverages and Tobacco, Oil and Gas, Real
Estate, Vehicles, Utilities, and Other Service industries.
• Positive income, positive incometax coefficients: Firms in three industries pay
their CEOs a higher bonus when incometax is high, holding constant income.
One explanation could be that the bonus remuneration is based on gross-, rather
than net-income, at least for Financial Institutions. For the Construction and
20I use the term “insignificant” when a coefficient is not significant at the 10% level.
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Transportation industries, however, the incometax coefficient estimate is surpris-
ingly high. One rationale behind this could be that CEOs are in fact incentivized
to generate high tax payments. This scenario could be relevant if a company is
(partly) under public ownership, like many public transportation firms, or other-
wise has an interest in high tax payments. It could be argued that construction
firms are exposed to a relatively high amount of regulation, bureaucracy, and also
business from public infrastructure projects so that they might find it particularly
opportune to propitiate the authorities with tax payments.21
• Insignificant income, insignificant incometax coefficients: For firms in the Man-
ufacturing and Software industries I find no significant relationship between the
CEO’s bonus and either firm income or income taxes. This might be due to the
notion that managers’ interests in these sectors are only aligned with those of the
shareholders by means of equity incentives.22
• Positive income, negative incometax coefficients: The results for firms in Whole-
sale and Retail, Other Industrials, and Electrics and Electronics suggest that on
top of being remunerated on net- rather than gross income, CEOs are incentivized
to consider taxes as a profit center and to reduce corporate tax payments. Espe-
cially for firms in the latter two industries, this seems plausible, since these com-
panies often have tax saving opportunities, such as production facilities abroad.
Following the interpretation of the results of the last category, I estimate Equation
3.3 incorporating indicators for the firms’ tax saving opportunities. The coefficient
21A report of Transparency International (2008) finds that the Construction industry is the one
most prone to bribery of public officials. In a similar fashion, firms in this industry might also tend to
“bribe” the authorities with high tax payments.
22Consider for example Google’s former CEO and owner of a substantial amount of company stock,
Eric Schmidt, who receives a one-dollar salary and declines to benefit from a bonus plan (cf. United
States Securities and Exchange Comission 2011). However, in 2009, he still received a holiday bonus
of 1660 dollars. Clearly, this amount is independent of firm income or incometax and can vary over
time.
Table 3.5: Subsamples: Industries, n=21921
Subsample income incometax
Agriculture and Mining 0.886** -0.091
(0.343) (2.058)
Communication 0.473*** -0.102
(0.058) (0.180)
Construction 9.970*** 17.411***
(0.399) (2.379)
Electrics and Electronics 0.756*** -2.154***
(0.056) (0.275)
Financial Institutions 0.597*** 0.362***
(0.028) (0.108)
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 0.729*** -0.581
(0.076) (0.395)
Manufacturing 0.033 0.347
(0.053) (1.678)
Oil and Gas 0.782*** 0.928
(0.097) (0.871)
Other Industrials 0.155*** -0.161**
(0.019) (0.073)
Other Services 1.327*** 0.937
(0.234) (0.899)
Real Estate 11.504** 27.947
(5.227) (23.748)
Software 0.080 0.054
(0.051) (0.192)
Transportation 0.387** 0.902*
(0.182) (0.512)
Vehicles 0.698*** -0.185
(0.057) (0.269)
Utilities 0.492*** 0.335
(0.139) (0.431)
Wholesale and Retail 0.685*** -1.150***
(0.060) (0.397)
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant
time effects. All firms have been matched to an industry based on SIC codes; when these were
unavailable an industry has been assigned based on the Compustat variable industry or on the
company name. The sample period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are in parentheses and
significance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table 3.6: Tax Sheltering Opportunities, n=21921
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
income 0.348*** 0.335*** 0.447*** 1.118***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.130)
income*foreign 0.006 0.056**
(0.027) (0.028)
income*highleverage 0.059** 0.028
(0.024) (0.024)
income*highcapitalintensity -0.166*** -0.138***
(0.025) (0.026)
income*small 2.226***
(0.800)
income*large -0.717***
(0.126)
incometax 0.319*** -0.454*** -0.062 0.334
(0.112) (0.075) (0.062) (0.523)
incometax*foreign -0.629*** -0.629***
(0.114) (0.117)
incometax*highleverage 0.474*** 0.310***
(0.096) (0.097)
incometax*highcapitalintensity -0.335*** -0.375***
(0.098) (0.102)
incometax*small 2.310
(3.697)
incometax*large 0.039
(0.510)
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant
time effects. For the univariate results based on size-subsamples, see Table 3.4. The indicator
variables are equal to one if: foreign – the firm has nonzero foreign income (10340 firms),
highleverage – the firm’s leverage is above the median value, highcapitalintensity – the firm’s
capital intensity is above the median value, small – the firm belongs to the smallest 25% of
firms in terms of total assets, large – the firm belongs to the largest 25% of firms in terms
of total assets. The sample period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are in parentheses and
significance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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estimates are shown in Table 3.6. The results in the first column are particularly
interesting. The sensitivity of the bonus to income is not significantly different for
firms that have foreign operations and for those that do not. This could be seen as
an indication that the general CEO remuneration practices do not differ between firms
that only operate domestically and firms that also generate income abroad. They do,
however, differ vastly in the sensitivity of the bonus to incometax: after a tax reduction
of one million dollars, CEOs in firms with foreign operations receive a bonus 629 dollars
higher than a CEO in a domestic-only firm would receive. This can be interpreted as
an indication that internationally active firms have more tax saving opportunities than
their domestic-only counterparts. As a consequence, they reward tax savings more
strongly. For CEOs in highly-levered firms (Column 2), the negative coefficient for
incometax is almost exactly offset by the interaction term. Apparently the reasoning
laid out in Atwood et al. (1998) seems to apply: firms that are financed with relatively
more debt already save taxes by declaring interest payments as a business expense,
limiting their possibilities to further reduce incometax. Thus, CEOs in those firms are
not specifically incentivized to do so. Also in accordance with their findings, capital-
intense firms highly encourage tax reductions in comparison with less capital-intense
firms (Column 3).
Note that this is a univariate comparison of the coefficients for income and in-
cometax. In order to alleviate this concern, I estimate the model with all tax saving
indicators, in addition to firm size, at once (Column 4). The coefficients for the different
interaction terms now give the slope effect of tax saving opportunities compared to the
reference group of mid-sized companies with only domestic operations, low leverage,
and low capital intensity. The effects of tax planning opportunities on the sensitivity of
the bonus to corporate income taxes remain qualitatively unchanged. Nonetheless, the
interaction terms of incometax and size are insignificant. The interpretation of this
result is that, in comparison to mid-sized, domestic-only, low-levered companies with
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low capital intensity, company size does not have a significant effect on the sensitivity
of the bonus to income tax.
3.4.2 Discussion
After finding out which CEOs are given incentives to reduce corporate taxes, the obvious
next step would be to find out whether these incentives work and such executives
actually do reduce tax payments. Using different firm-level proxies for tax-reduction
incentives, studies like Phillips (2003), Armstrong et al. (2012), or Gaertner (2013) find
evidence on this, which could give rise to concerns about reverse causality. However, this
chapter presents results of the relationship between intra-firm variations in taxes and
variations of bonus payments, while the mentioned studies find an effect of variations
in this very relationship on variations of a function of tax payments. One is generally
confronted with a problem of reverse causality when one wants to estimate the effect
of B on A, but in reality, A (also) causes variations in B. In our context, this could
be the case when, for example, an increase in the sensitivity of the bonus to the firm’s
tax payments leads the CEO to reduce corporate taxes, which is not just a possibility,
but a conjecture that motivates this study. Nonetheless, this concern does not pose a
problem for the present study since the bonus contract specifies ex ante how variations
in tax payments will impact the manager’s bonus. The CEO observes this contract
and undertakes the actions that maximize his utility. This will yield a realization of tax
payments, according to which his bonus is calculated and paid out. We are interested in
the contracted relationship between taxes and bonus and the data allow us to estimate
this relationship, regardless of whether or not it induces the CEO to undertake actions
aimed at reducing tax payments.
It could be argued that the analysis is prone to spurious results because of omitted
variables that may affect CEO bonuses. In principle, it is conceivable that such left-out
variables are correlated with both, income and tax. As an example, imagine a CEO’s
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bonus is tied to the total revenue and to the return on assets of his firm. While neither
income nor tax are explicitly mentioned in his bonus contract, the present estimation
setup could yield significant coefficients for both measures. This is so because total
revenue determines both measures and return on assets is a function of net income.
This is, however, acceptable for the analysis, since this mechanism entails that the
CEO is in fact incentivized implicitly to manipulate net income and taxes.
Finally, it must be noted that when we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeffi-
cient on incometax is equal to zero, this does not have to be the case because taxes do
in fact not play a role in the CEO’s bonus plan; it is possible that this occurs due to
a lack of variations in incometax that are independent of variations in income. How-
ever, in most cases I do find significant coefficients on incometax, which allows us to
dismiss this concern. If anything, it supports the view that I give a lower bound of the
statistical significance of the coefficient estimates.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter was to test whether CEOs’ bonus contracts set incentives to
reduce corporate tax payments. The analysis shows this is indeed the case when looking
at the whole sample, where I find that bonuses increase with tax reductions, while
controlling for net income. In some instances, however, the contrary is the case; CEOs in
the Construction and Transportation industries even seem to be incentivized to generate
high tax payments. It appears that the result of the estimation over the whole sample
is driven by firms in the Wholesale and Retail, Electrics and Electronics, and Other
Industrial sectors, which account for almost half of the sample. In accordance with
previous literature, I further find that a number of proxies for tax planning opportunities
are related to a high negative sensitivity of the bonus to income tax payments.
These results provide a lower-bound estimate of the CEO’s incentives to reduce
corporate taxes, since equity compensation that is paid in addition to the bonus au-
tomatically sets such incentives. Keeping this in mind, the results are particularly
noteworthy, since they imply that a profit increase from tax savings is rewarded more
strongly than profit increases from other sources. A possible explanation could be that
running an aggressive tax strategy is not only costly to the CEO in terms of effort, but
that it could also bear additional risk for him. This hypothesis is in line with Gaertner
(2013). Apart from a potentially higher volatility of firm fundamentals, and thus of the
bonus payments, the executive might incur personal risks such as a loss of reputation
(cf. Rego and Wilson 2012), or even the threat of legal prosecution. Federal law (cf.
Office of the Law Revision Counsel 2010) subjects all responsible persons who willfully
retain due taxes from the government to a penalty equal to the amount of taxes held
back. A decision of the United States District Court Middle District of Florida Tampa
Division (2009) shows that a CEO can indeed be considered a “responsible person” and
can be held personally liable for withholding taxes from the government.
70 Paid to Cheat
From a shareholders’ perspective, setting such incentives makes sense if the expected
gains from running an aggressive tax strategy exceed the expected costs from potential
risk to firm value and from incentivizing the CEO. Graetz (2008) postulates that “a tax
shelter is a deal done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be
very stupid” (p. 116). From an economist’s perspective, the conduct of incentivizing a
CEO to act in such a “very stupid” way can be seen as an instance of rent seeking; it is
a costly activity that leads to a redistribution, rather than the production, of wealth.
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3.A.1 Sample Attrition
The total number of observations is reached as follows.
Table 3.7: Sample Attrition
Observations with... Number of Observations
Match in Compustat and Execucomp 29379
Missing values for any variable -2205
Negative pre-tax income -4824
Foreign incorporation -428
Negative bonus -1
Total 21921
3.A.2 Correction for compensation expenses
Since it would be counterintuitive if a company rewarded the CEO for tax savings
due to expenses for his own bonus (cf. Chen and Chu 2005), I correct our two main
explanatory variables income and incometax for bonus expense. Consider the following
simple model of linear profit taxation:
pigross = pinet + T = (1− τ)pigross + τ ∗ pigross = R− C1 − C2,
where pi denotes profits, τ the tax rate and T , R, C1, C2 are payable income taxes,
revenue, business expenses, and CEO bonus expenses, respectively. We observe pinet,
T , and C2 and want to construct a measure of net profits before bonus expense, pˆinet,
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and a measure of income taxes before bonus expense, Tˆ . Since
pigross = pinet + T = (1− τ)(R− C1 − C2) + τ(R− C1 − C2),
we get that
pˆinet = (1− τ)(R− C1) = (1− τ)(R− C1 − C2) + (1− τ)C2 = pinet + (1− τ)C2,
and likewise
Tˆ = τ(R− C1) = τ(R− C1 − C2) + τC2 = T + τC2.
Using that τ = Tpinet+T , these variables can readily be constructed with the variables in
the dataset.
3.A.3 Variable Definitions
The variables used have the following relationship to Compustat / ExecuComp items.
Table 3.8: Variable Definitions
Variable Compustat/ExecuComp Item
bonus BONUS +NONEQ INCENT
income IB + (1− TXPIB+TXP )(BONUS +NONEQ INCENT )
incometax TXP + TXPIB+TXP (BONUS +NONEQ INCENT )
size AT
foreign 1 if PIFO (= 0
leverage DLTT+DLCAT
capitalintensity PPEGTAT
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The variable bonus is measured in thousands of dollars; all other dollar-measures
are given in millions of dollars. Throughout this chapter, the expressions “income” and
“profits” are used interchangeably. Unless otherwise noted, they refer to the after-tax
measure.

Chapter 4
Paid to Quit Cheating
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There are different ways a government can show mercy after a citizen has become clean
about tax evasion: An amnesty is often granted for a limited time only, it may be
confined to a certain group of perpetrators and may come with a fine, albeit lower than
normal. It does, however, promise exemption from further criminal prosecution when
evaded taxes are declared and paid. Sometimes, tax authorities also give tax offenders
a break by allowing a remission of due taxes due to personal hardships. Over and above
such temporary policies, many governments show permanent leniency towards perpe-
trators that turn themselves in (see OECD 2015 for an overview). The question arises
whether such voluntary disclosure programs sustainably increase government revenue
or whether they destroy the deterrence effect of the penal code.
Tax evasion has recently been a popular topic in international news. Particularly in
Germany, where punishment can be up to ten years imprisonment for severe infractions,
some prominent cases have emerged in the recent past (see e.g. Koschnitzke 2014).
However, to many people’s surprise, the German government has had a standing offer
for tax offenders who turn themselves in. As a matter of fact, tax evasion is the only
felony for which perpetrators can avoid criminal prosecution when they undo the crime
(Fischer 2014). Below a certain threshold, a tax evader can dodge punishment altogether
as long as he comes clean about all his misreportings; he only needs to pay his tax debt
plus interest. Even though the rules have recently been tightened, punishment for tax
evasion above the threshold remains quite lenient, with only a small fine added to the
perpetrator’s tax debt: from 2015 on, a fine of ten percent will be collected from 25,000
Euros of evaded taxes. It goes up to twenty percent for sums above 1,000,000 Euros
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2014).
In a rational world with perfect information, there would be no room for these
leniency programs. However, several things may cause a perpetrator to change his
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mind after engaging in tax evasion: maybe his ethical convictions change, maybe he
only realizes his true feeling of guilt once the deed has been done, maybe there is a shock
on (his perception of) the probability to get caught. It may then be in the government’s
best interest to make it not too costly for tax evaders to turn themselves in. However,
awareness of such a leniency policy may also cause more people to evade taxes in the
first place.
Building on Becker (1968) and Allingham and Sandmo (1972), I develop a model
in which agents evade taxes whenever the expected benefits of doing so exceed the
expected punishment. As a variation on such classical models, however, I introduce
another component to said punishment: in addition to potentially facing prosecution
by the government, agents may also expose a feeling of guilt. I now assume that some
agents may feel more or less guilty about cheating on their tax reports after handing
them in. The analysis provides insights into the costs and benefits for the government
of offering agents the possibility to make a voluntary disclosure. I show that leniency
does not only increase government revenue when it comes as a surprise, but even when
it is anticipated by the agents.
I thereby offer a new explanation as to why we can observe permanent voluntary
disclosure programs. Malik and Schwab (1991) present a model in which agents are
uncertain about their utility function. When they are risk-neutral, it is never optimal
for the government to offer a guaranteed amnesty. Andreoni (1991), on the other hand,
shows that a (partial) ‘permanent amnesty’ can increase efficiency in a model where
agents use the amnesty as insurance against an otherwise uninsurable consumption
shock. In a more recent contribution, Bayer et al. (2015) explain the occurrence of
amnesties by agents who discount possible future fines too much. In a strategic game
between taxpayers and government, an equilibrium with almost-certain amnesties could
arise.
4.1 Introduction 79
The study that comes closest to my approach is that of Langenmayr (2015). Just
like her, I consider a set of agents heterogeneous in their feeling of guilt with regards
to evading taxes. This results in three different classes of agents: those who are always
honest, those who initially cheat and then turn themselves in, and those who feel so
little guilt that they are dishonest throughout. However, the assumption that drives the
profitability of the voluntary disclosure program in her model is that there is a shock to
the probability to get caught. While I do believe that in many cases this is the reason
why people make use of voluntary disclosure, a permanent leniency program would also
require permanent volatility of the (perceived) detection probability. Furthermore, in
Langenmayr’s (2015) paper, the fine for users of the leniency program is endogenous,
with the detection probability being fixed. While there are arguments to defend either
modeling approach, I believe that the choice to endogenize the auditing probability
better reflects reality. Her model predicts a lower fine for voluntary disclosure when a
positive shock to the detection rate becomes more likely, which contrasts with the recent
developments in Germany. This study adds another justification why governments may
want to provide a standing leniency offer to risk-neutral agents, even in times when
there is little variation in tax offender conviction rates.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes
the model. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4.3, followed by a concluding
section.
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4.2 The Model
We set up a model in which agents base their decision to evade taxes on their feeling of
guilt about cheating in their tax reports, on the fine when caught, and on whether or
not there is a voluntary disclosure program in place. The tax authorities, on the other
hand, are treated as a simple profit center of the government that only cares about
maximizing revenue subject to enforcement costs (cf. Heesen 2003). The sequence of
events is as follows:
1. Nature draws guilt-types; the legislature sets the legal framework, including a fine
for tax evasion; agents receive taxable income.
2. Agents decide whether to evade taxes, based on their guilt parameter and their
expectation of the probability to get audited.1
3. The tax authorities decide on how many audits will take place by fixing the staff
assignment.2
4. After handing in their tax reports, a random set of agents draws a new guilt
parameter; the tax authorities may offer a voluntary disclosure program; tax
evaders decide whether to make use of it.
5. Audits take place; convicted perpetrators are fined; government revenue is col-
lected.
Before handing in their tax reports, agents face the following utility function:
Ui = w − T + di − pfdi − (1− p) 0− θi1di,
1We will consider the case when agents anticipate a voluntary disclosure program and when they
do not.
2Idem. In the model, there is informational symmetry concerning voluntary disclosure programs.
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where w is the gross wage, T are taxes owed, di is the amount of taxes that agents can
evade, p is the probability to get audited and caught, f > 1 is the penalty factor when
caught, and θi1 ∼ U [0, 1] determines the exogenous cost of engaging in tax evasion, such
as a feeling of guilt. Note that this means that we focus on the most interesting part of
the population, namely those agents who may or may not choose to cheat, depending
on the size of pf . Naturally, there is a (possibly quite large) set of taxpayers who would
never consider cheating, thus having θi1 > 1. Hypothetically, one could also think of
some agents with θi1 < 0, so a part of a population that feels joy, rather than guilt,
when evading taxes. I disregard this possibility in this study. For simplicity, I assume
that agents can choose to declare their taxes truthfully, i.e. di = 0, or cheat by a fixed
amount di = d¯.3 There is a unit mass of agents, heterogeneous only in their uniformly
distributed guilt factor θi1.
The tax authorities want to maximize revenue subject to enforcement costs. Net
revenue is given by
R = HT +D
(
T − d¯+ pfd¯)− φp,
where H stands for the mass of agents who are honest, D for the dishonest, and φ
represents the auditing technology and hence the cost of increasing p.4 I assume the
penalty factor f is given by the institutional framework, so the tax authorities can only
choose p. An interpretation for this could be that when we speak of the tax authorities,
we mean an organ of the executive branch that, while working on a fixed budget, can
make some adjustments to p over time, possibly due to a shift of priorities, whereas
changes to f can only be made in the long-run by the legislature, or cannot be made at
3Of course, in this stylized model, the tax authorities could easily identify tax fraud: whoever
declares T − d1 rather than T must be evading taxes. This problem would be mitigated with sufficient
heterogeneity in the tax burden, but implementing this would not yield additional insights in the scope
of this analysis.
4Another facet of φ could be that too many audits (of innocent citizens) face public disapproval,
see e.g. Leonard and Zeckhauser (1987).
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all because of constitutional constraints. Another explanation would be that a sizeable
part of the ‘punishment’ of getting caught cannot be set by the government in the
first place: it could be argued that the reaction of society to convicted tax offenders
far outweighs any punishment manifested in the penal code, an idea that was already
implemented in the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
After handing in their tax reports, some agents draw a new guilt factor θi2 ∼ U [0, 1],
which will not only affect their decision on whether or not to evade taxes in the future,
but – if they cheated before – will also determine how they feel about the fact that there
is a tax obligation that they concealed from the authorities. As a consequence an agent
may have preferred to evade more or less taxes than he initially decided. I assume that,
after handing in his tax return, an agent can only increase the amount he declares, that
is declare T rather than T − d¯, which may alleviate his feeling of guilt. If he does so
and there is no leniency program in place, the agent would be treated as if he had been
audited and caught, leading to a certain penalty of fd¯. Clearly, an agent would never
declare higher taxes, even when he feels more guilt than he initially thought, because
f > 1 implies his change in utility from turning himself in, ∆Ui = −fd¯ + θi2d¯, would
be negative.5
However, the government may want to make use of the fact that some agents feel
more guilty than they did when they handed in their tax return. Offering a voluntary
disclosure program with little or no punishment could increase government revenue.
I assume that agents anticipate they may draw a new θ, but are not sure whether
they will and, if so, whether it will be higher or lower. An agent knows that his guilt
parameter will remain the same, i.e. θi2 = θi1, with probability q. With probability
1− q, he will receive a new draw θi2 ∼ U [0, 1] ; θi2 ⊥ θi1. It is crucial whether the tax
5This assertion follows from the assumption that the new guilt factor is drawn from the same
distribution as the old one. If we allowed θi2 ≥ 1 we may very well observe agents turning themselves
in, despite the absence of a leniency program.
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authorities realize they may want to offer a leniency program in the future and whether
agents anticipate that. My conjecture is that, when an agent is aware of the voluntary
disclosure program ex ante, a particularly guilt-driven agent may still evade taxes in
the ‘hope’ of feeling less guilty in the future. If his hope does not materialize, he can
always turn himself in later. Agents with low morals, however, may or may not evade
taxes. If they expect to draw a high θ in the next period, they could report truthfully,
but it seems that cheating on the initial tax report is a superior strategy, because one
cannot cheat retroactively.
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4.3 Analysis
In order to develop some intuition for the model, we first consider a case in which
agents receive only one draw of their guilt parameter. Since there is no variation that
could affect the agents’ choice to evade taxes, there is no use for the tax authorities to
consider offering a voluntary disclosure program. We then allow some agents to receive
a new draw of their guilt parameter and consider the implications of having a voluntary
disclosure program when it is anticipated, and when it is not.
4.3.1 Benchmark with Static Guilt
It is straightforward to see that an agent will evade taxes whenever
pf + θi1 < 1,
that is the expected punishment factor pf and the agents’ feeling of guilt θi1 are perfect
substitutes. Note that if pf > 1, nobody would cheat on taxes.6 It may at first seem
counter-intuitive that a government would choose an expected punishment that does not
exceed the potential benefits from misbehavior, but it can be argued that this reflects
reality, at least for some parts of the penal code concerning taxes. There are several
reasons why this may be the case. Slemrod (1992) claims that “it is extraordinarily
expensive to arrange an enforcement regime so that, from a strict cost-benefit calculus,
noncompliance does not appear attractive to many citizens” (p. 7). There can also
be a natural or ethical upper bound to both punishment and prosecution itself; Stigler
(1970) has argued that marginal deterrence requires marginal punishment, making it
impractical to deter people from certain behavior. Needless to say, we do observe tax
evasion, so apparently the expected punishment does not always exceed the benefits.
6This of course relies on the assumption that there are no notorious cheaters with θi1 < 0.
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In the absence of a voluntary disclosure program, the tax authorities can hence
expect all agents below
θˆ1 = 1− pf
to evade taxes, with all others declaring truthfully. This leaves them with a mass of
1 − pf evaders, and a mass of 1 − (1− pf) = pf truthful reporters, so net revenue
becomes
R = (1− (1− pf))T + (1− pf) (T − d¯+ pfd¯)− φp. (4.1)
It can already be seen that the cost of increasing p is accompanied by two different
benefits. A higher probability to get caught leads to less agents avoiding taxes, but
government revenue also increases on the intensive margin: agents that evade taxes are
more often caught yielding additional revenue in the form of fines. Assuming the tax
authorities can choose p directly, net revenue maximization yields the following first
order condition:
max
p
R⇒ 0 = fd¯− pf 2d¯+ fd¯ (1− pf)− φ.
From left to right, the terms in this condition show that an increase in the audit
probability results in: a higher tax yield from less agents evading, a decrease in fines
collected when less agents evade, higher revenue from an increase in convictions of
those who do evade, and higher auditing costs. Rearranging yields the optimal auditing
probability:
p∗ =
2fd¯− φ
2f 2d¯
. (4.2)
So the tax authorities will choose a positive auditing probability whenever 2fd¯ > φ, see
the discussion below. Furthermore, p∗ < 1 is always satisfied for f > 1, so whenever a
fine is charged on top of the taxes that have been evaded. Let us see how the optimal
audit probability p∗ depends on the parameters of the model:
∂p∗
∂φ
< 0,
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so, the cheaper it becomes to audit, the more often the tax authorities will do it;
∂p∗
∂d¯
=
1
2f 2d¯2
> 0,
so the higher the amount that perpetrators can evade, the more effort the tax authorities
are going to put into detecting them;
∂p∗
∂f
=
1
f 2
− 4
(
2fd¯− φ)
4f 3d¯
,
so it is not clear whether or not the tax authorities decrease the audit probability after
increases in the exogenous fine factor. As a matter of fact, the negative effect of an
increase in f starts to overrule its positive effect on p∗ as soon as the total fine exceeds
the total cost of increasing p, that is ∂p
∗
∂f < 0 iff φ < fd¯. In other words, when a
low total fine is increased, it leads to an increase in the audit probability, whereas for
sufficiently large values of f , a further increase starts to lead to decreases in p∗. Consider
the two mechanisms at work: first, increases in f can make it worthwhile to increase
p, because an increase in the audit probability may yield more net revenue, as can be
seen in the numerator of Expression (4.2). To be more precise, the revenue for each p
(also) increases in f because it implies less people evading taxes and at the same time a
higher punishment when caught. Second, increases in f may allow the tax authorities
to generate the same net revenue while setting a lower p. The downward effect of f can
be seen in the denominator of Expression (4.2). It exists because the revenue for each p
also decreases in f , for when less people evade taxes also less people will be fined; over
and above this, the higher the fine f is, the bigger will be the loss from every person
not fined, an effect that enters the equation multiplicatively. Now, when f is already
at a high level, a further increase of p will actually decrease net revenue, because too
few people will evade taxes, thus be caught and forced to pay this relatively high fine.
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Using our result for p∗, we can see that the agent who is indifferent between evading
taxes and reporting truthfully is characterized by:
θˆ1 =
φ
2fd¯
.
Note that this implies an interior solution as long as 0 < φ < 2fd¯. As we saw above,
it must be reasonably ”cheap” for the government to audit in order to pick a positive
audit probability. When it becomes very cheap to audit, i.e. φ→ 0, nobody will evade
taxes. This is so because costless auditing leads the tax authorities to set p∗ = 1f , which
is sufficient to deter even the least guilt-driven of agents from cheating.7
For later comparison, the generated net revenue when implementing the optimal
strategy, i.e. using Expression (4.2) in Equation (4.1) is equal to:
R(p∗) = T − φ
f
+
φ2
4f 2d¯
. (4.3)
4.3.2 Voluntary Disclosure after a New Draw of θ
When there is a chance that agents receive a new draw of θ, the government can make
use of the fact that some agents feel more guilty and would have preferred to declare
higher taxes by offering a voluntary disclosure program after the deadline for tax reports,
but before the audits take place. If there is no penalty on declarations under voluntary
disclosure, exactly those agents will retroactively declare their taxes truthfully who
would have done so from the beginning, had their guilt parameter always been the one
they newly drew. That is, the agents for whom the following holds will turn themselves
in: θi1 < θˆ1 ∧ θi2 > θˆ1. In the remainder of this subsection, we will derive results for
different information structures in order to find out when offering a voluntary disclosure
program increases government revenue.
7Note that auditing everyone is not needed, even when it is free; this is so because agents base their
decision to evade taxes on the expected punishment.
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New Draw of θ without Voluntary Disclosure
We first analyze the implications of a new draw of the guilt parameter in the absence of
a leniency program. I do assume that agents foresee that their guilt factor may change
in the future. Their utility function thus becomes:
Ui = w − T + di − pfdi − (1− p) 0− Eθdi
= w − T + di − pfdi − (1− p) 0− (qθi1 + (1− q)Eθi2) di
= w − T + di − pfdi − (1− p) 0−
(
qθi1 + (1− q) 1
2
)
di.
Remember that agents cannot reverse their decision later, so they evade taxes if pf +
qθi1 + (1− q) 12 < 1, leading to a cutoff value of
θ˜1 =
1
2
+
1
2 − pf
q
. (4.4)
It is instructive to see what this condition implies for two extreme cases: First,
nobody will evade taxes if 0 > 12 +
1
2−pf
q holds. This is equivalent to pf >
1
2 +
1
2q,
so an expected punishment factor between 12 and 1 is sufficient to deter everyone from
cheating, depending on q.8 Second, everyone will cheat if 1 < 12 +
1
2−pf
q , or pf <
1
2 − 12q,
so, again depending on q, an expected punishment factor between 0 and 12 will induce
everyone to evade taxes. For given levels of p, the threshold guilt parameter reacts to
changes in q as follows:
∂θ˜1
∂q
=
− (12 − pf)
q2
.
So the marginal tax evader’s guilt parameter increases in q for large values of pf and
decreases for low levels. This means that for a large expected fine factor, more agents
keeping their guilt parameter leads to more tax evasion. The reason for this is that an
8Note that the optimal audit probability derived later implies an interior solution for all q > fd¯
fd¯+2φ
.
The tax authorities’ response to very low levels of q is discussed below.
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increase in q puts less weight on the expected guilt parameter of 12 , which favors honesty
for high pf , and cheating for low values. Keep in mind, though, that this analysis
disregards any impact that q may have on p. In the absence of a leniency program, the
tax authorities fix the audit probability optimizing the following expression:
R = (1− θ˜1)T + θ˜1
(
T − d¯+ pfd¯)− φp
= (
1
2
−
1
2 − pf
q
)T +
(
1
2
+
1
2 − pf
q
)(
T − d¯+ pfd¯)− φp, (4.5)
which would yield the following audit probability:
p˜ =
(q + 3) fd¯− 2qφ
4f 2d¯
=
q + 3
4f
− qφ
2f 2d¯
. (4.6)
Note that naturally, for q = 1, this result is consistent with what we found above for
p∗.9 For q → 0 the distribution of expected guilt-types becomes more and more narrow,
until all agents know they will draw a new θ and make their decisions based on Eθ = 12 .
The tax authorities can then simply deter everyone from engaging in tax evasion by
setting p = 12f , which is profitable when d¯ ≥ φ2f . Generally, in the absence of voluntary
disclosure, the audit probability reacts to changes in q as follows:
∂p˜
∂q
=
fd¯− 2φ
4f 2d¯
.
So, when the benefit from auditing, or more precisely the total fine fd¯ collected from one
convicted perpetrator, is high compared to the cost of auditing φ, a higher probability
of agents keeping their type comes about with a higher audit probability. As we can
see in Equation (4.4), increases in q lead to more tax evasion for large pf , and to less
evasion for small values of pf , c.p. This is so because a large pf implies that only
agents with a very low θi1 consider to evade taxes; if now q increases, these agents are
less ‘afraid’ that they will make a new draw θi2, which in expected terms they value
9Also note that, just like in the benchmark case, the audit probability always remains below 1 as
long as f > 1. Naturally, it will be positive when the numerator is positive.
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at 12 , a figure that would deter them from evading taxes. Likewise, for low pf , an
increase in q means agents with a high θi1 can more confidently make an honest tax
report, because the chance of receiving a low draw of θi2 that would encourage cheating
decreases. Similarly, when the fine to be collected is rather high, increases in q warrant
a lower p, in part due to the fact that there are already not so many perpetrators, and
there is no need to further deter the increasingly heterogeneous population of expected
types. When the fine is low, however, the increase in heterogeneity means there is a
larger set of agents to be susceptible to deterrence, so p increases.
With this understanding of the impact of q on p˜, let us reconsider our analysis of
the effect of q on θ˜1:
dθ˜1
dq
=
∂θ˜1
∂q
+
∂θ˜1
∂p˜
dp˜
dq
=
− (12 − p˜f)
q2
− f
q
(
fd¯− 2φ
4f 2d¯
)
.
Using our result from Equation (4.6) this yields after some rewriting:
dθ˜1
dq
=
1
4q2
> 0.
So when the tax authorities pick the optimal auditing probability, more agents keeping
their initial guilt factor leads to an increase of the marginal tax evader’s parameter,
and thus to more tax evasion. In other words, the tax authorities design the auditing
probability such that more uncertainty concerning agents’ guilt parameters leads to
more tax honesty.
Substituting Expression (4.6) into Equation (4.5), net revenue becomes, after some
rewriting:
R(p˜) = T +
−1 + 2q − q2
16
d¯+
−3− 2q + q2
4
φ
f
+
2q − q2
4
φ2
f 2d¯
. (4.7)
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Once again, this is a general form for which our benchmark in the previous subsection
was a special case; substituting q = 1 into Equation (4.7) will yield exactly the result
found in Equation (4.3).
Voluntary Disclosure is Not Anticipated
The tax authorities now offer a non-anticipated leniency program with no punishment
for agents who turn themselves in. Everyone who has θi2 > θˆ2 = 1− p˜f will either turn
themselves in or never have evaded taxes in the first place. It is important to realize
that offering a voluntary disclosure program comes at no immediate cost to the tax
authorities when agents do not anticipate it will be offered. There is only the benefit of
some agents making use of the program by retroactively declaring higher taxes. How
many agents make use of voluntary disclosure depends on the absolute and relative size
of θ˜1 =
1
2 +
1
2−p˜f
q and θˆ2 = 1− p˜f . To be more precise, when θ˜1 > θˆ2 there is a mass of:
• 1− θ˜1 agents who were honest from the beginning,10
• q
(
θ˜1 − θˆ2
)
agents who evaded taxes, but turned themselves in after realizing their
guilt parameter did not change,
• (1− q)
(
θ˜1
(
1− θˆ2
))
agents who turned themselves in after learning their new
parameter,
• qθˆ2 agents whose guilt parameter was low enough to cheat from the outset,
• (1− q)
(
θ˜1θˆ2
)
agents who, after receiving a new draw still find it worthwhile to
evade taxes.
10Note that this contains a mass of (1− q)
(
1− θ˜1
)
θˆ2 agents who would have liked to become
cheaters, but cannot undo their honest tax report.
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If, on the other hand θ˜1 < θˆ2, a mass of:
• 1− θ˜1 agents make an honest report from the outset,11
• (1− q) θ˜1
(
1− θˆ2
)
agents turn themselves in after evading taxes, because they
drew a higher guilt parameter,
• qθ˜1 agents cheat from the outset while keeping their parameter,
• (1− q) θ˜1θˆ2 agents will not turn themselves in after evading taxes, in spite of
receiving a new guilt parameter.
So offering a surprise voluntary disclosure program will simply increase the govern-
ment revenue, as compared to the expression in Equation (4.7), by exactly
∆LR1R =
(
d¯− p˜f d¯) [q (θ˜1 − θˆ2)+ (1− q)(θ˜1 (1− θˆ2))]
in the case of θ˜1 > θˆ2, and by
∆LR2R =
(
d¯− p˜f d¯) ∗ (1− q) θ˜1 (1− θˆ2)
if θ˜1 < θˆ2. The only requirement for these expressions to be positive is that pf < 1,
which has been discussed above. Nonetheless, one can see that the profitability of a
surprise leniency program not only depends on q, but also on the relative size of θ˜1 and
θˆ2, and thereby also on p˜f . More precisely, we end up in the first case if θ˜1 > θˆ2, which
is equivalent to p˜f < 12 or 1 < q
(
2φ
fd¯
− 1
)
. In order for this to be possible, we must have
2φ > fd¯. The crucial difference between these cases is that in the first scenario, there
is a group of agents making use of voluntary disclosure that is missing in the second
scenario: those agents that evaded taxes in the hope of receiving a lower draw of the
guilt parameter, but eventually turn themselves in when they realize their parameter
11Note that the contained mass of agents who would have liked to become cheaters, but cannot undo
their honest tax report (1− q)
(
1− θ˜1
)
θˆ2 + q
(
θˆ2 − θ˜1
)
is broader than in the case when θ˜1 > θˆ2.
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did not change. Analogously, there is group of agents in the second scenario that is
missing in the first: those who regret their decision to make an honest tax report, even
though their parameter did not change. For the intuition behind these decisions I refer
to the discussion about the impact of q on p˜ in the previous subsection.
It could be argued that the tax authorities may want to revise the audit probability
once voluntary disclosure has been offered and taken advantage of - either to catch
the remaining perpetrators or to save resources from unnecessary audits. It is quite
conceivable that the tax authorities consider offering voluntary disclosure before setting
the audit probability, but I do not focus on such a situation here. While it may be
possible to surprise agents with a leniency program, sudden changes in the auditing
frequency may not be easy to implement and will hardly come unnoticed; the tax
authorities would face yet another credibility problem. A brief sketch of the resulting
corner solution is provided in the Appendix.
To summarize, if the tax authorities only consider offering a voluntary disclosure
program after fixing the audit probability, their revenue will simply increase due to the
agents who turn themselves in. Let us now look at what happens when agents anticipate
that a leniency program will be offered.
Anticipated Voluntary Disclosure
An agent who anticipates a program will be offered by the tax authorities faces the
following decision: When he decides to declare truthfully, he can expect:
Ui = w − T + (q) 0 + (1− q) 0,
when he decides to evade taxes in the first period, however, he derives an expected
utility of
EUi = w − T + d¯+ (q)max
{−d¯,−pfd¯− θi1d¯}+ (1− q)Emax{−d¯,−pfd¯− θi2d¯} .
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Clearly, the second strategy weakly dominates the first one, because it will always at
least yield w−T . Note that this is regardless of any auditing probability the government
may choose. As a consequence, all agents will decide to evade taxes in the first period.
The tax authorities will then face two groups of agents that turn themselves in after
a voluntary disclosure program has been offered: agents who had a high θi1 and did
not receive a new draw, and those who received a high new draw. More precisely, the
following mass of agents will make use of the program:
H2 = (q)
(
1− θˆ1
)
+ (1− q)
(
1− θˆ2
)
,
where θˆ1 = θˆ2 = 1− pf , which gives
H2 = pf.
As a consequence, revenue is given by
R = T − d¯+ (pf) d¯+ (1− pf) pfd¯− φp,
yielding
p∗ =
2fd¯− φ
2f 2d¯
,
as in the benchmark case when agents keep their guilt parameter for sure, and thus also
the same revenue, as described in Equation (4.3).
To summarize, when agents anticipate that a voluntary disclosure program is offered,
the government will make exactly the same revenue as if there had not been (the
possibility of) a new draw of agents’ guilt parameter.
Comparison
When there is the possibility to offer an unanticipated voluntary disclosure program, it
clearly raises revenue compared to a situation without a leniency program. The open
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question is now whether even anticipated voluntary disclosure increases government
revenue. Let us recall Equation (4.3), which not only describes net revenue when
agents keep their guilt parameter with certainty, but also for the case when they do and
voluntary disclosure is anticipated:
R(p∗) = T − φ
f
+
φ2
4f 2d¯
.
To compare, the revenue when there is no leniency program from Equation (4.7) can
be rewritten to:
R(p˜) = T − (1− q)
2
16
d¯+
(
(1− q)2
4
− 1
)
φ
f
+ q (2− q) φ
2
4f 2d¯
.
We can now see that net revenue with an anticipated voluntary disclosure program is
larger than with none whenever R(p∗) > R(p˜), or
(1− q)2
16
d¯ >
(−1 + 2q − q2) φ2
4f 2d¯
.
It is noteworthy that, except for q = 1 of course, this is always satisfied, because
(−1 + 2q − q2) < 0 ∀ 0 ≤ q < 1. In other words, as soon as there is a small chance that
agents draw a new guilt parameter, the government revenue even with an anticipated
voluntary disclosure program is always larger than that with no leniency program at all.
The reason for this is that offering an anticipated program allows the agents to adjust
their decisions on tax evasion to their relevant guilt parameters once they are known.
This yields more revenue than a situation where agents have to base their decisions
on their expecations of guilt parameters. We have already seen that revenue with a
surprise voluntary disclosure program is larger than with no leniency rule. We can thus
conclude that, whenever there is a chance that agents’ attitude towards tax honesty
may vary over time, the tax authorities would always like to offer a voluntary disclosure
program.
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4.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents a model that adds to the existing explanations as to why gov-
ernments may offer voluntary disclosure programs for tax evaders. When parts of the
populations feel more or less guilty about evading taxes after reports are due, govern-
ment revenue can be increased by offering tax evaders a chance to turn themselves in,
even when this is costless for them.
I have shown that the tax authorities’ reaction to changes in the exogenously set
punishment for tax evasion can go in two directions. When said fine is relatively low,
increasing it will lead them to expanding their auditing efforts, with the opposite being
true for high fines. I further show that the immediate effect of the volatility of people’s
feeling of guilt on evading tax is ambiguous: a higher amount of agents receiving a new
draw may lead to more or less tax evasion, depending on how severely it is punished.
In equilibrium, however, the tax authorities will set the frequency of audits such that
more people making a new draw leads to less tax evasion.
The key result of this study is that government revenue not only rises with surprise
voluntary disclosure, but even when such a program is anticipated. This holds true in
spite of the concern that an anticipated program initially leads to more tax evasion,
which is often stated in the literature and confirmed by my analysis. In a dynamic
setting, however, things may change. If the gains from a surprise voluntary disclosure
program are much larger than those of an anticipated one, the government may find it
in their best interest to refrain from using voluntary disclosure at times (cf. Andreoni
1991, Bayer et al. 2015). The rationale behind this is that it may be worthwhile to
forego the benefits of anticipated voluntary disclosure in some periods in order to alter
agents’ expectations and hence reap the possibly larger benefits of a surprise program
in some other periods.
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Discussing the welfare implications of voluntary disclosure is not an easy task. Slem-
rod (2007) makes the point that ”[a]lthough the cost of [more auditing] is a true resource
cost, the revenue brought in does not represent a net gain to the economy, but rather
a transfer from private (noncompliant) citizens to the government” (p. 43). A leniency
program expands the choice set of taxpayers, giving them another tool to maximize util-
ity. At the same time, government revenue increases without incurring said additional
resource costs, let alone the social cost of inevitably auditing a number of compliant
citizens. On the other hand, the existence of voluntary disclosure programs may be
perceived as unfair, because it grants criminals the opportunity to dodge punishment.
The wish to avoid the long-term effects of this notion can be another explanation why
leniency programs are not as ubiquitous as my analysis would prescribe.
98 Paid to Quit Cheating
4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Revised p after a Surprise Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram
Assuming the tax authorities can revise their decision on the audit probability after
offering an unanticipated voluntary disclosure program, they face the following revenue:
R = H (p˜) ∗ T +D (p˜) ∗ (T − d¯+ p2fd¯)− φp2
where the mass of agents that are (ex post) honest is
H = 1− θ˜1 + q
(
θ˜1 − θˆ2
)
+ (1− q)
(
θ˜1
(
1− θˆ2
))
= 1− qθˆ2 − (1− q) θ˜1θˆ2,
and the mass of agents that are dishonest is
D = qθˆ2 + (1− q) θ˜1θˆ2,
with θ˜1 =
1
2 +
1
2−p˜f
q and θˆ2 = 1− p˜f . Since the mass of tax evaders does not depend on
the revised audit probability p2, the result will be a corner solution – as soon as fd¯ > φ,
the tax authorities want to audit everyone, and noone otherwise.
4.A.2 Allowing for a Higher Guilt Parameter
In the main text, we have focussed on those agents with θ ∈ [0, 1]. This entails that
when there is no expected punishment for tax evasion, pf = 0, even the agent with the
highest possible guilt parameter would only marginally decide not to cheat. Naturally,
it can be argued that there is a sizable part of society that would make an honest tax
report even in the absence of punishment, namely those agents with θ > 1. Allowing
for such a broader distribution of types in the model does not have a qualitative impact
on the results. What does change, is that there is a larger set of agents that is honest
from the beginning.
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Consider the benchmark case of subsection 4.3.1: when we allow θ ∼ U [0, b] ; b > 1,
the tax authorities’ revenue changes to
R = (b− (1− pf))T + (1− pf) (T − d¯+ pfd¯)− φ1p.
That is, the marginal considerations of the tax authorities remain unaffected, because
their decisions do not have an impact on the additional agents with θ ∈ [1, b]. There is
simply a larger fraction of agents that is honest in their tax reports.
It is interesting to note, though, that even when there is no leniency program in
place, we may observe some agents who turn themselves in once that agents draw a
new θ. The reason for this is that it is possible that an agent who cheated on his tax
report may find it in his best interest to come clean about it whenever his new draw of
θ is very high. More specifically, it has to be so high that he does not mind the certain
punishment when alleviating his guilt. The marginal cheater’s guilt parameter from
Equation (4.4) changes to:
θ˜1 =
b
2
+
1− b2 − pf
q
,
leading to a revenue function of
R = (
b
2
− 1−
b
2 − pf
q
)T +
(
b
2
+
1− b2 − pf
q
)(
T − d¯+ pfd¯)− φ1p.
So unlike above, the larger dispersion of guilt-types does affect the number of cheaters,
not only the number of honest tax payers. This is so because agents now realize they may
draw a much higher parameter later, making cheating less attractive, c.p. Consequently,
the optimal auditing probability also changes to:
p˜ =
4− b+ bq
4f
− qφ1
2f 2d¯
.
Note that for all b > 1 this is always less than the result we found when θ ∈ [0, 1]. It is
only positive for b < 2qφ1
fd¯(q−1)− 4q−1 , which is only possible for 2qφ1fd¯ < 4. Despite the lower
100 Paid to Quit Cheating
auditing probability, allowing for higher guilt parameters reduces overall cheating. This
result extends to the other information structures discussed in the main text.
4.A.3 Voluntary Disclosure is Anticipated and Carries a Small
Fine
In the main text, evading taxes was a weakly dominant strategy for all agents when
the voluntary disclosure was anticipated, because it implied everyone could revise their
decision on tax evasion costlessly. I now introduce a small fine factor ∆f that is imposed
whenever agents turn themselves in. The decision problem now looks as follows:
When an agent decides to declare truthfully, he can expect:
Ui = w − T,
when he decides to evade taxes in the first period, however, he derives an expected
utility of
EUi = w − T + d¯+ (q)max
{−d¯−∆fd¯,−pfd¯− θi1d¯}
+(1− q)Emax
{
− ¯d−∆fd¯,−pfd¯− θi2d¯
}
.
It is apparent that cheating no longer clearly dominates. The agents’ choice depends on
the parameters of the model and the magnitude of p. We need to distinguish up to four
cases to determine the benefit of evading taxes for each agent, depending on whether
or not they would make use of the program when they keep their guilt parameter, and
whether or not they would when making a new draw.
Let us solve by backward induction and consider the case when an agent has already
decided to evade taxes. Regardless of whether or not he made a new draw, he would
make use of voluntary disclosure if the benefits outweigh the costs:−d¯−∆fd¯ > −pfd¯−
θid¯. This means the marginal user of the voluntary disclosure program will have a guilt
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parameter of
θˆ1 = 1− (pf −∆f).
When agents make the decision to evade taxes in the first place, they compare this
cutoff value to their current guilt parameter and their expected parameter in case they
face a new draw, which is Eθ2 = 12 . Thus, when confronted with a new draw, agents
expect to make use of the program only if 12 < 1− (pf −∆f).
We will now look at the four different cases. If an agent expects to use the leniency
rule regardless of making a new draw, so if θi1 > θˆ1 and
1
2 > θˆ1, he will evade taxes if:
d¯ > q
(
d¯+∆fd¯
)
+ (1− q) (d¯+∆fd¯) .
Note that this is never satisfied. If he expects to use the leniency rule when making
a new draw, but not when keeping his current draw, so if θi1 < θˆ1and
1
2 > θˆ1, he will
evade taxes if:
d¯ > q
(
pfd¯+ θi1
)
+ (1− q) (d¯+∆fd¯) .
This yields a cutoff value of θ˜1 = 1− pf − 1−qq ∆f . Note that this is always smaller than
θˆ1. When the agent expects to use the leniency rule when keeping his draw, but not
when making a new one, so when θi1 > θˆ1and
1
2 < θˆ1, he will evade taxes if:
d¯ > q
(
d¯+∆fd¯
)
+ (1− q)
(
pfd¯+
1
2
d¯
)
.
When an agent does not expect to use the voluntary disclosure program, regardless of
whether or not he makes a new draw, he will evade taxes if:
d¯ > q
(
pfd¯+ θi1
)
+ (1− q)
(
pfd¯+
1
2
d¯
)
.
This yields a cutoff value of θ˜1 =
1
2+
1
2−pf
q ∆f . With this information, the tax authorities
can maximize their revenue, choosing p.

Chapter 5
Summary
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The common theme in the chapters of this book is asymmetric information, which can
create an imbalance of power between the two parties of a transaction. I describe a
variety of instruments that the informationally disadvantaged organizations may use
to overcome the resulting adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In the second
chapter, workers dispose of information that would be crucial for the firm to have in
order to select the right people to hire. Uncommitted agents may trick an employer
into giving them a job, even though it is not profitable for the firm. While this can be
averted with a steep wage profile, it triggers another adverse selection problem: some
agents may wish to hide the fact that they are unmotivated in order to reap the high
wage later in their careers. In that situation, a firm can offer an exit bonus to convince
unwanted employees to quit. But even once the best possible employees are hired, it is
impossible for a firm to monitor each and every one of their activities. An executive,
for example, may prefer to avoid risky strategies, such as tax sheltering, even though
this would be in the interest of the shareholders. This moral hazard problem can be
overcome by setting appropriate incentives, such as the cash bonus analyzed in the third
chapter. Similarly, a government that does not know everything about its citizens relies
on penal deterrence in order to incentivize people to pay their taxes. As was argued
in Chapter 4, however, the fear of punishment is not the only reason taxpayers refrain
from cheating. When people’s social preferences concerning tax evasion vary over time,
the government can alleviate the fact that this is unobservable by offering a voluntary
disclosure program.
In the two theoretical chapters of this book, we have considered several non-traditional
elements when describing human behavior in our models. In Chapter 2, the reason why
workers may work hard is not because they have monetary incentives to do so, but
because some of them may enjoy their work. Similarly, the taxpayers in the fourth
chapter not only fear punishment when considering to evade taxes, but are also afraid
of their own conscience. In addition to these deviations from the assumption that peo-
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ple are purely selfish in their behavior, this book also displays instances of the bounds
to individual rationality. In Chapters 2 and 4, we allow the agents to be not fully aware
of the action space of their counterpart. Doing so is an arguable undertaking, which
may give rise to the notion that the validity of our results is only temporary. Indeed,
we show that the firm in our framework should only offer an exit bonus when it comes
as a surprise and I acknowledge the idea that a voluntary disclosure program for tax
evaders may be more profitable when it is not anticipated. The more widespread these
policies become, the harder it is to argue that agents are still surprised about them.
When this concern materializes, a way out may be the randomization of the policy’s
application. Supplemental research could give insights as to what such a mixed strategy
should optimally look like and if and when it can indeed replace the moment of surprise
that the organizations in our models benefit from.
The empirical application in Chapter 3 aims at overcoming the fact that publicly
traded firms do not have to disclose the exact details of their executives’ remuneration
plans. The legislature faces a dilemma here: on the one hand, it would be favorable to
impede illegal – or undesirable – activities by prohibiting firms to set the correspond-
ing incentives to their CEOs. On the other hand, doing so may force firms to reveal
confidential information that they would like to conceal from the competition. It could
be argued that it should be sufficient from a policy point of view to disallow the illegal
activity itself, rather than also banning firms from providing the incentives to engage in
such activities. Nonetheless, my analysis did not make a distinction between legal and
illegal tax sheltering. It is possible to make a case for more transparency in executive
compensation even when it concerns legal activities. First, consumers and other insti-
tutions may have preferences not only regarding their own tax morale (cf. Chapter 4),
but also regarding that of their business partners. Making sure that the incentivization
of tax sheltering is disclosed would thus allow them to make more informed decisions
on whom to do business with. Second, it may be impossible to codify all the activities
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that the policy maker would like to make illegal, so that more transparency together
with a ban on incentivizing tax sheltering could act as a secondary deterrent against
unwanted activities. Third, the existence of such incentives may give an indication as
to which firms criminal investigation should target. Evaluating the total welfare im-
plications of either approach is an empirical question that lies beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
The focus in this book has been on monetary incentives, but of course they may
not always be the right tools for organizations to reach their goals. Towards the end of
Chapter 2, we argue that our explanation for the existence of an exit bonus appears to be
superior to alternative interpretations. What we cannot claim, of course, is that this is
really the key to the success of the firms that apply this policy. Our motivating example
of Zappos for example applies a wide range of, sometimes unusual, policies, especially
concerning the work environment and the management style. One could hypothesize
that, maybe in lieu of or in addition to an exit bonus, it could be beneficial to create
a work environment that only motivated workers enjoy, making it not worthwhile for
the others to stay. In a sufficiently large firm, field experiments could be run with
interventions for both exit bonuses and work environment characteristics. The way
I modeled the voluntary disclosure program in Chapter 4, its application implies a
financial gain for tax offenders who want to clear their conscience, as compared to a
world without such a program. In reality of course, it also implies a relief from criminal
prosecution and non-monetary punishment. The thought of running an experiment on
the intensity of either the financial or non-financial effects of these programs will likely
be dismissed on legal grounds. However, a letter experiment that randomly reminds
citizens of the existence of a voluntary disclosure program could vary the awareness of
the policy and hence give insights as to why and how these programs drive people to
come forward with their past crimes.

Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
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Vrije handel is de hoeksteen van onze markt economie. Zowel personen als organisaties
kunnen hun welvaart verhogen door het ruilen van goederen of diensten. Wanneer een
partij meer informatie heeft over een transactie dan de andere partij, kan dit gebruikt
worden voor het eigen belang. In dit proefschrift wordt gekeken naar de prikkels die
organisaties inzetten voor individuele spelers, zoals werknemers of belastingbetalers, om
voorgenoemde obstakels te overwinnen.
Het tweede hoofdstuk is gezamenlijk werk met Robert Dur en is ge¨ınspireerd op een
firma die iets ongebruikelijks doet: in plaats van werknemers te belonen voor prestaties,
bieden ze werknemers geld om vrijwillig ontslag te nemen. Deze praktijk trok de aan-
dacht van bedrijfswetenschappers en wij hebben de belangrijkste argumenten uit een
aantal essays verwerkt in een model dat uitlegt onder welke voorwaarden een dergelijk
plan voordelig is. In een steeds complexere werkomgeving, zijn de sancties en beloftes
volgens de klassieke economische benadering soms niet toepasbaar. In dit geval kan
een bedrijf werknemers willen vinden die intrinsiek gemotiveerd zijn om zich er van te
verzekeren dat de belangen van de werknemer op een lijn liggen met die van het bedrijf:
als mensen hun werk leuk vinden, doen ze het vaak ook goed. Dit is een algemeen
aanvaard gegeven voor diverse banen, maar is natuurlijk van toepassinng op allerlei
situaties.
De taak van het bedrijf kan dan verschuiven van het verschaffen van de juist prikkels
voor zijn werknemers naar het selecteren van de meest geschikte werknemers, namelijk
de gemotiveerde werknemers. Deze taak kan lastig blijken wanneer ongemotiveerde
werknemers een belang hebben om hun gemotiveerde collegae te imiteren. In ons model
moet het bedrijf een stijgend salaris bieden zodat alleen de werknemers met een lange
termijn interesse in de baan overwegen te solliciteren. Een gevolg hiervan is dat sommige
ongemotiveerde werknemers niet bereid zijn ontslag te nemen wanneer zij uitvinden
dat ze het werk niet leuk vinden. In dat geval kan het bieden van het juiste bedrag
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aan mensen die besluiten te stoppen, ervoor zorgen dat de ongemotiveerde werknemers
ontslag nemen. Tegelijkertijd zullen de gemotiveerde werknemers willen blijven vanwege
de motivational rents die ze ervaren. Ons model laat zien dat de exit bonus de winst van
het bedrijf alleen doet toenemen wanneer werknemers deze niet anticiperen. Bovendien
laten we zien dat een bedrijf de exit bonus alleen als nuttig ervaart wanneer motivatie
niet een heel grote rol speelt.
Ofschoon intrinsieke motivatie belangrijk is voor sommige beroepen, verschaffen
toch bijna alle beursgenoteerde bedrijven extrinsieke motivatie aan hun managers in
de vorm van aandelen, opties en bonussen. Waar het verschaffen van aandelen en
opties in het algemeen het belang van een manager op een lijn brengt met het belang
van een bedrijf, kunnen geld bonussen gebruikt worden om andere specifieke doelen
te belonen. Dit kan een handig middel zijn wanneer aandelen en opties een manager
onvoldoende aansporen om zich met bepaalde activiteiten bezig te houden. Zo kan
bijvoorbeeld het verminderen van de belastinglasten leiden tot een substantiele toename
in netto winst, maar dit kan een risicovolle activiteit zijn voor een manager. Als de
belastingontwijkende activiteiten van een firma illegaal zijn, kan een manager hier zelfs
persoonlijk aansprakelijk voor worden gesteld als dit wordt ontdekt. Als gevolg hiervan
kan het voor een winstmaximaliserend bedrijf zo zijn dat het in zijn belang is om
duidelijke prikkels voor belastingontwijking te verschaffen.
Hoewel bedrijven moeten opgeven hoeveel bonussen zij uitbetalen aan hun mana-
gers, blijft meestal de exacte opmaak van de contracten vertrouwelijk. We weten daarom
niet precies welk gedrag en welke uitkomsten worden beloond met een cash bonus. In
het derde hoofdstuk worden data van de 1.500 belangrijkste beursgenoteerde bedrijven
in de Verenigde Staten bestudeerd. Ik vind aanwijzingen dat de gemiddelde bonusrege-
ling belastingbesparing buitensporig beloond wanneer dit wordt vergeleken met andere
maatregelen die de netto winst van het bedrijf verhogen. Dit bevestigt de hypothese
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dat managers compensatie verlangen voor het toegenomen risico dat zij lopen indien
zij een agressieve belasting strategie volgen. In overeenkomst met bestaande literatuur,
vind ik een aanzienlijke heterogeniteit in de compensatieregelingen in de verschillende
bedrijfstakken. Mijn primaire resultaat wordt voornamelijk veroorzaakt door bedrijven
in de sectoren Industrie en Handel. Ook blijkt dat bedrijven met grotere belastingsplan
mogelijkheden eerder de bonus van hun CEO afhankelijk maken van de hoogte van de
venootschapsbelasting.
Net als een CEO die zich bezig houdt met belastingvermijding voor zijn bedrijf,
lopen ook burgers die belasting ontduiken op hun persoonlijke belastingaangifte het
risico om gepakt te worden. Vergeleken met de potentiele voordelen van het ontlo-
pen van belasting, is het risico tamelijk laag, waardoor een neoklassieke analyse van
de monetaire kosten en voordelen van belastingontduiking niet in staat is te verklaren
waarom de meeste mensen hun belasting betalen. Sociale voorkeuren, zoals het moge-
lijke schuldgevoel van een belastingfraudeur, kunnen hier een verklaring zijn. En toch
lopen overheden regelmatig aanzienlijke inkomsten mis als gevolg van belastingontdui-
king. In veel landen worden belastingontduikers in de gelegenheid gesteld om van een
inkeerregeling gebruik te maken. Vaak bieden deze programma’s een strafvermindering
of vrijstelling en soms zijn ze zelfs een vast onderdeel van het rechtssysteem. Het is dui-
delijk dat een dergelijk programma hogere belastinginkomsten faciliteert wanneer het
onverwacht als eenmalig aanbod ingezet wordt. Toch rijst de vraag of een vergelijkbare
permanente regelgeving ook een positief effect op de overheidsbegroting heeft.
Als mensen dezelfde informatie hadden op het moment dat zij besluiten belasting
te ontduiken als wanneer hen een inkeerregeling aangeboden wordt, zou niemand hier
gebruik van maken. In het vierde hoofdstuk bespreek ik de gevolgen van de mogelijke
verandering in het ervaren schuldgevoel na het indienen van de belastingsaangifte. Mijn
model geeft inzicht in de kosten en baten van een inkeerregeling voor een overheid die
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zijn burgers deze mogelijkheid biedt. Ik toon aan dat een inkeerregeling de belastings-
inkomsten niet alleen verhoogt wanneer het onverwacht wordt aangeboden, maar ook
wanneer deze door de belastingbetaler geanticipeerd wordt.
Zusammenfassung
(Summary in German)

117
Der freiwillige Tausch von Gu¨tern und Dienstleistungen bildet die Grundlage unserer
Marktwirtschaft. Individuen und Organisationen begeben sich aus eigenem Interesse
in solche Tauschgescha¨fte. Allerdings kann das Zustandekommen dieser Transaktionen
gefa¨hrdet werden, wenn ein Beteiligter u¨ber mehr Informationen verfu¨gt als der andere.
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit den Anreizen, die verschiedene Organisationen Personen
wie zum Beispiel Angestellten oder Steuerzahlern geben, um diese Probleme zu umge-
hen.
Das zweite Kapitel entstand in Zusammenarbeit mit Robert Dur und wurde durch
eine Firma inspiriert, die sich eine ungewo¨hnliche Personalpolitik zu eigen macht: an-
stelle einer erfolgsbasierten Bezahlung wird neuen Mitarbeitern Geld dafu¨r geboten,
das Unternehmen zu verlassen. Unsere Arbeit verwertet die Grundgedanken einiger be-
triebswirtschaftlicher Aufsa¨tze und formuliert ein o¨konomisches Modell, welches erkla¨rt,
unter welchen Bedingungen ein solches Ku¨ndigungsprogramm Teil einer optimalen Per-
sonalpolitik darstellen kann. In der heutigen komplexen Arbeitswirklichkeit versagen
ha¨ufig die Instrumente, die die klassische Wirtschaftsforschung Unternehmen anbietet,
um ihre Mitarbeiter anzuregen im Interesse der Firma zu handeln. Hier kann die Su-
che nach intrinsisch motivierten Mitarbeitern unerla¨sslich werden, denn Angestellte, die
Freude an ihrem Beruf haben, leisten oftmals nachweislich bessere Arbeit.
Anstatt ihren Angestellten ada¨quate Anreize zu setzen, wird es in solchen Fa¨llen
zur Aufgabe einer Firma, u¨berhaupt erst die richtigen Mitarbeiter zu finden und zu
behalten. Dieses Unterfangen kann problematisch werden, wenn unmotivierte Mitar-
beiter versuchen, ihre motivierten Kollegen zu imitieren. In unserem Model muss das
Unternehmen zu Beginn einen niedrigeren Lohn anbieten, der mit der Zeit ansteigt, so-
dass sich nur Arbeitnehmer bewerben, die auch langfristig bescha¨ftigt werden mo¨chten.
Dies fu¨hrt allerdings dazu, dass – des hohen Lohns wegen – auch unmotivierte Mit-
arbeiter im Unternehmen verbleiben mo¨chten, nachdem sie herausgefunden haben,
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dass sie keine Freude an der Arbeit haben. In einer solchen Situation kann ein richtig
dosiertes Ku¨ndigungsprogramm ermo¨glichen, dass unmotivierte Mitarbeiter ku¨ndigen,
wa¨hrend die motivierten in der Firma verbleiben mo¨chten um ihre Motivationsrenten
abzuscho¨pfen. Unser Modell zeigt, dass ein solches Ku¨ndigungsprogramm fu¨r die Firma
nur dann profitabel ist, wenn die Mitarbeiter davon u¨berrascht werden. Wir zeigen au-
ßerdem, dass ein Ku¨ndigungsprogramm nur dann sinnvoll ist, wenn die Bedeutung von
Motivation am Arbeitsplatz von begrenztem Ausmaß ist.
Auch wenn intrinsische Motivation in vielen Branchen eine wichtige Rolle spielt,
so stellen doch die meisten Aktiengesellschaften extrinsische Motivation in der Form
von Eigenkapitalanreizen und Boni fu¨r ihre leitenden Angestellten bereit. Wa¨hrend Ak-
tien und Optionen das Einkommen eines Managers grundsa¨tzlich an den Firmenwert
binden, ko¨nnen Bonusprogramme genutzt werden, um das Erreichen anders spezifizier-
ter Ziele zu belohnen. Insbesondere wenn die Eigenkapitalanreize nicht ausreichen, um
einen Manager zu einem bestimmten Verhalten zu bewegen, ko¨nnen Boni ein sinnvolles
Instrument sein. So ko¨nnen beispielsweise Bemu¨hungen zur Reduzierung der Steuerlast
einen erheblichen Einfluss auf das Nettoergebnis einer Firma haben, aber gleichzei-
tig ein hohes Risiko fu¨r den Manager darstellen. Insbesondere wenn die Grenzen zur
Steuerhinterziehung u¨berschritten werden, ist dies gefa¨hrlich, da der Manager in einem
solchen Fall perso¨nlich haftbar gemacht werden kann. Folglich kann es fu¨r ein Unter-
nehmen sinnvoll sein, diesem erho¨hten Risiko fu¨r den Manager mit gezielten Anreizen
zur Steueroptimierung entgegenzutreten.
Firmen mu¨ssen zwar die Ho¨he der ja¨hrlich entrichteten Bonuszahlungen offenle-
gen, die genaue Vergu¨tungsstruktur bleibt jedoch gewo¨hnlich unter Verschluss, sodass
nicht bekannt ist, welches Managerverhalten genau mit einem Bonus belohnt wird.
Im dritten Kapitel verwende ich Daten zu den 1.500 wichtigsten US-amerikanischen
Aktiengesellschaften, um zu untersuchen, ob ein Zusammenhang besteht zwischen an-
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fallenden Unternehmenssteuern und der an Vorstandsvorsitzende (CEOs) ausbezahlten
Boni. Die Analyse zeigt, dass im durchschnittlichen Anreizprogramm Steuerersparnisse
sta¨rker belohnt werden als andere Maßnahmen, die das Nettoergebnis eines Unterneh-
mens erho¨hen. Dies kann ein Hinweis darauf sein, dass Manager tatsa¨chlich fu¨r das
zusa¨tzliche Risiko, das mit der aktiven Steuergestaltung einhergeht, entscha¨digt wer-
den mu¨ssen. Im Einklang mit der einschla¨gigen Literatur kann weiter gezeigt werden,
dass die Entlohnungspraxis zwischen den verschiedenen Branchen stark variiert. An-
scheinend wird das zentrale Ergebnis der vorliegenden Studie durch Unternehmen aus
dem verarbeitenden Gewerbe und aus dem Handel bestimmt. Ferner kann nachgewiesen
werden, dass Firmen mit stark ausgepra¨gten Steuergestaltungsmo¨glichkeiten eher dazu
tendieren, ihre Managergeha¨lter von den anfallenden Unternehmenssteuern abha¨ngig
zu machen.
A¨hnlich wie ein Manager, der sich um Steuervermeidung fu¨r seine Firma bemu¨ht,
gehen auch Einzelpersonen, die in ihrer eigenen Steuererkla¨rung unrichtige Angaben
machen, das Risiko ein entdeckt zu werden. Zieht man die mo¨glichen finanziellen Vor-
teile von Steuerhinterziehung in Betracht, ist dieses Risiko jedoch erstaunlich niedrig.
Eine neoklassische Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse kann folglich nicht erkla¨ren, warum die mei-
sten Bu¨rger ihre Steuern tatsa¨chlich bezahlen. Soziale Pra¨ferenzen, wie zum Beispiel
die mo¨glichen Schuldgefu¨hle eines Steuerbetru¨gers, ko¨nnen hier als Erkla¨rungsansatz
dienen. Und doch entgehen dem Staat durch Steuerhinterziehung regelma¨ßig beacht-
liche Einnahmen. In vielen La¨ndern wird Steuersu¨ndern die Mo¨glichkeit zur Selbstan-
zeige gegeben. Oft bieten diese Programme Straferleichterungen oder sogar -befreiung,
manchmal sind sie u¨berdies ein fortwa¨hrender Bestandteil der Rechtsordnung. Es ist
offensichtlich, dass ein solches Selbstanzeigeprogramm das Steueraufkommen erho¨ht,
wenn es singula¨r eingesetzt wird. Es stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob sich auch eine
entsprechende dauerhafte Regelung positiv auf den Staatshaushalt auswirkt.
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Wenn Steuerpflichtige zum Zeitpunkt der (potentiellen) Steuerhinterziehung u¨ber
die selben Informationen verfu¨gten wie in dem Moment, in dem ihnen die Gelegen-
heit zur Selbstanzeige gegeben wird, so wu¨rde kein Gebrauch von der Mo¨glichkeit zur
Selbstanzeige gemacht werden. Im vierten Kapitel ero¨rtere ich die Auswirkungen ei-
ner mo¨glichen Variabilita¨t von Schuldgefu¨hlen nach Abgabe der Steuererkla¨rung. Das
entwickelte Modell gibt Auskunft u¨ber Kosten und Nutzen fu¨r einen Staat, der sich
entscheidet, seinen Bu¨rgern die Mo¨glichkeit zur Selbstanzeige zu gewa¨hren. Es wird
gezeigt, dass ein Programm zur Selbstanzeige das Steueraufkommen nicht nur dann
erho¨ht, wenn es u¨berraschend angeboten wird, sondern auch wenn es vom Steuerzahler
antizipiert wird.
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